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#### CIR Will Pass Now – Obama Has the PC and Hes Pushing IT

By: Reid J. Epstein 10/17, 2013 Obama’s latest push features a familiar strategy http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=00B694F1-5D59-4D13-B6D1-FC437A465923

President Barack Obama made his plans for his newly won political capital official — he’s going to hammer House Republicans on immigration.¶ And it’s evident from his public and private statements that Obama’s latest immigration push is, in at least one respect, similar to his fiscal showdown strategy: yet again, the goal is to boost public pressure on House Republican leadership to call a vote on a Senate-passed measure.¶ “The majority of Americans think this is the right thing to do,” Obama said Thursday at the White House. “And it’s sitting there waiting for the House to pass it. Now, if the House has ideas on how to improve the Senate bill, let’s hear them. Let’s start the negotiations. But let’s not leave this problem to keep festering for another year, or two years, or three years. This can and should get done by the end of this year.”¶ (WATCH: Assessing the government shutdown's damage)¶ And yet Obama spent the bulk of his 20-minute address taking whack after whack at the same House Republicans he’ll need to pass that agenda, culminating in a jab at the GOP over the results of the 2012 election — and a dare to do better next time.¶ “You don’t like a particular policy or a particular president? Then argue for your position,” Obama said. “Go out there and win an election. Push to change it. But don’t break it. Don’t break what our predecessors spent over two centuries building. That’s not being faithful to what this country’s about.”¶ Before the shutdown, the White House had planned a major immigration push for the first week in October. But with the shutdown and looming debt default dominating the discussion during the last month, immigration reform received little attention on the Hill.¶ (PHOTOS: Immigration reform rally on the National Mall)¶ Immigration reform allies, including Obama’s political arm, Organizing for Action, conducted a series of events for the weekend of Oct. 5, most of which received little attention in Washington due to the the shutdown drama. But activists remained engaged, with Dream Act supporters staging a march up Constitution Avenue, past the Capitol to the Supreme Court Tuesday, to little notice of the Congress inside.¶ Obama first personally signaled his intention to re-emerge in the immigration debate during an interview Tuesday with the Los Angeles Univision affiliate, conducted four hours before his meeting that day with House Democrats.¶ Speaking of the week’s fiscal landmines, Obama said: “Once that’s done, you know, the day after, I’m going to be pushing to say, call a vote on immigration reform.”¶ (Also on POLITICO: GOP blame game: Who lost the government shutdown?)¶ When he met that afternoon in the Oval Office with the House Democratic leadership, Obama said that he planned to be personally engaged in selling the reform package he first introduced in a Las Vegas speech in January.¶ Still, during that meeting, Obama knew so little about immigration reform’s status in the House that he had to ask Rep. Xavier Becerra (D-Calif.) how many members of his own party would back a comprehensive reform bill, according to a senior Democrat who attended.¶ The White House doesn’t have plans yet for Obama to participate in any new immigration reform events or rallies — that sort of advance work has been hamstrung by the 16-day government shutdown.¶ But the president emerged on Thursday to tout a “broad coalition across America” that supports immigration reform. He also invited House Republicans to add their input specifically to the Senate bill — an approach diametrically different than the House GOP’s announced strategy of breaking the reform into several smaller bills.¶ White House press secretary Jay Carney echoed Obama’s remarks Thursday, again using for the same language on immigration the White House used to press Republicans on the budget during the shutdown standoff: the claim that there are enough votes in the House to pass the Senate’s bill now, if only it could come to a vote.¶ “When it comes to immigration reform … we’re confident that if that bill that passed the Senate were put on the floor of the House today, it would win a majority of the House,” Carney said. “And I think that it would win significant Republican votes.”

#### Economic engagement with Mexico is politically divisive despite supporters

Wilson 13 – Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International. Center for Scholars (Christopher E., January, “A U.S.-Mexico Economic Alliance: Policy Options for a Competitive Region,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new\_ideas\_us\_mexico\_relations.pdf)

At a time when Mexico is poised to experience robust economic growth, a manufacturing renaissance is underway in North America and bilateral trade is booming, the United States and Mexico have an important choice to make: sit back and reap the moderate and perhaps temporal benefits coming naturally from the evolving global context , or implement a robust agenda to improve the competitiveness of North America for the long term . Given that job creation and economic growth in both the United States and Mexico are at stake, the choice should be simple, but a limited understanding about the magnitude, nature and depth of the U.S.-Mexico economic relationship among the public and many policymakers has made serious action to support regional exporters more politically divisive than it ought to be.

#### PC Key to Immigration

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It is exactly that sort of say-no attitude among Republicans that the White House has signaled it will highlight in its immigration push.¶ Obama himself said there won’t always be agreements, but in his repeated praise for “reasonable Republicans,” he made clear that he will continue to point to conservative and tea party-affiliated Republicans as the impediment to the progress he seeks — and pushing GOP lawmakers on this issue, as he did in the recent fiscal fights, to sign on to some version of the Senate’s latest compromise.¶ “We all know that we have divided government right now,” Obama said Thursday. “There’s a lot of noise out there, and the pressure from the extremes affect how a lot of members of Congress see the day-to-day work that’s supposed to be done here.”

#### That contains the aging crisis

Joseph Nye 12, former US assistant secretary of defense and chairman of the US National Intelligence Council, 12/10/12, Immigration and American Power, www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/obama-needs-immigration-reform-to-maintain-america-s-strength-by-joseph-s--nye

While too rapid a rate of immigration can cause social problems, over the long term, immigration strengthens US power. It is estimated that at least 83 countries and territories currently have fertility rates that are below the level needed to keep their population constant. Whereas most developed countries will experience a shortage of people as the century progresses, America is one of the few that may avoid demographic decline and maintain its share of world population. For example, to maintain its current population size, Japan would have to accept 350,000 newcomers annually for the next 50 years, which is difficult for a culture that has historically been hostile to immigration. In contrast, the Census Bureau projects that the US population will grow by 49% over the next four decades. Today, the US is the world’s third most populous country; 50 years from now it is still likely to be third (after only China and India). This is highly relevant to economic power: whereas nearly all other developed countries will face a growing burden of providing for the older generation, immigration could help to attenuate the policy problem for the US. In addition, though studies suggest that the short-term economic benefits of immigration are relatively small, and that unskilled workers may suffer from competition, skilled immigrants can be important to particular sectors – and to long-term growth. There is a strong correlation between the number of visas for skilled applicants and patents filed in the US. At the beginning of this century, Chinese- and Indian-born engineers were running one-quarter of Silicon Valley’s technology businesses, which accounted for $17.8 billion in sales; and, in 2005, immigrants had helped to start one-quarter of all US technology start-ups during the previous decade. Immigrants or children of immigrants founded roughly 40% of the 2010 Fortune 500 companies. Equally important are immigration’s benefits for America’s soft power. The fact that people want to come to the US enhances its appeal, and immigrants’ upward mobility is attractive to people in other countries. The US is a magnet, and many people can envisage themselves as Americans, in part because so many successful Americans look like them. Moreover, connections between immigrants and their families and friends back home help to convey accurate and positive information about the US. Likewise, because the presence of many cultures creates avenues of connection with other countries, it helps to broaden Americans’ attitudes and views of the world in an era of globalization. Rather than diluting hard and soft power, immigration enhances both. Singapore’s former leader, Lee Kwan Yew, an astute observer of both the US and China, argues that China will not surpass the US as the leading power of the twenty-first century, precisely because the US attracts the best and brightest from the rest of the world and melds them into a diverse culture of creativity. China has a larger population to recruit from domestically, but, in Lee’s view, its Sino-centric culture will make it less creative than the US. That is a view that Americans should take to heart. If Obama succeeds in enacting immigration reform in his second term, he will have gone a long way toward fulfilling his promise to **maintain the strength of the US.**

#### Uncontrolled aging crisis causes nuclear war

**Howe and Jackson 09**, researchers at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and co-authors of "The Graying of the Great Powers: Demography and Geopolitics in the 21st Century," (Neil and Richard, “ The World Won't Be Aging Gracefully. Just the Opposite.” January 4, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/02/AR2009010202231.html>)

The world is in crisis. A financial crash and a deepening recession are afflicting rich and poor countries alike. The threat of weapons of mass destruction looms ever larger. A bipartisan congressional panel announced last month that the odds of a nuclear or biological terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the year 2014 are better than 50-50. It looks as though we'll be grappling with these economic and geopolitical challenges well into the 2010s. But if you think that things couldn't get any worse, wait till the 2020s. The economic and geopolitical climate could become even more threatening by then -- and this time the reason will be demographics. Yes, demographics, that relentless maker and breaker of civilizations. From the fall of the Roman and the Mayan empires to the Black Death to the colonization of the New World and the youth-driven revolutions of the 20th century, demographic trends have played a decisive role in precipitating many of the great invasions, political upheavals, migrations and environmental catastrophes of history. By the 2020s, an ominous new conjuncture of these trends will once again threaten massive disruption. We're talking about global aging, which is likely to have a profound effect on economic growth, living standards and the shape of the world order. For the world's wealthy nations, the 2020s are set to be a decade of hyperaging and population decline. Many countries will experience fiscal crisis, economic stagnation and ugly political battles over entitlements and immigration. Meanwhile, poor countries will be buffeted by their own demographic storms. Some will be overwhelmed by massive age waves that they can't afford, while others will be whipsawed by new explosions of youth whose aspirations they cannot satisfy. The risk of social and political upheaval and military aggression will grow throughout the developing world -- even as the developed world's capacity to deal with these threats weakens. The rich countries have been aging for decades, due to falling birthrates and rising life spans. But in the 2020s, this aging will get an extra kick as large postwar baby boom generations move into retirement. According to the United Nations Population Division (whose projections are cited throughout this article), the median ages of Western Europe and Japan, which were 34 and 33 respectively as recently as 1980, will soar to 47 and 52, assuming no miraculous change in fertility. In Italy, Spain and Japan, more than half of all adults will be older than the official retirement age -- and there will be more people in their 70s than in their 20s. Graying means paying -- more for pensions, more for health care, more for nursing homes for the frail elderly. Yet the old-age benefit systems of most developed countries are already pushing the limits of fiscal and economic affordability. By the 2020s, political warfare over brutal benefit cuts seems unavoidable. On one side will be young adults who face declining after-tax earnings, including many who often have no choice but to live with their parents (and are known, pejoratively, as twixters in the United States, kippers in Britain, mammoni in Italy, nesthocker in Germany and freeters in Japan). On the other side will be retirees, who are often wholly dependent on pay-as-you-go public plans. In 2030, young people will have the future on their side. Elders will have the votes on theirs. Bold new investments in education, the environment or foreign assistance will be highly unlikely. Aging is, well, old. But depopulation -- the delayed result of falling birthrates -- is new. The working-age population has already begun to decline in several large developed countries, including Germany and Japan. By 2030, it will be declining in nearly all of them, and in a growing number, total population will be in steep decline as well. The arithmetic is simple: When the average couple has only 1.3 children (in Spain) or 1.7 children (in Britain), depopulation is inevitable, unless there's massive immigration. The economics of depopulation are grim. Even at full employment, real gross domestic product may decline, because the number of workers will be falling faster than productivity is rising. With the size of markets fixed or shrinking, businesses and governments may try to lock in their positions through cartels and protectionist policies, ushering in a zero-growth psychology not seen since the 1930s. With each new birth cohort smaller than the last, the typical workplace will be top-heavy with graybeards. Looking for a flexible, creative, entrepreneurial labor force? You'll have come to the wrong address. Meanwhile, with the demand for low-wage labor rising, immigration (assuming no rise over today's rate) will double the percentage of Muslims in France and triple it in Germany. By 2030, Amsterdam, Marseille, Birmingham and Cologne are likely to be majority Muslim. In Europe, the demographic ebb tide will deepen the crisis of confidence reflected in such best-selling books as "France is Falling," by Nicolas Baverez; "Can Germany Be Saved?" by Hans-Werner Sinn; or "The Last Days of Europe," by Walter Laqueur. The media in Europe are already rife with dolorous stories about the closing of schools and maternity wards, the abandonment of rural towns and the lawlessness of immigrant youths in large cities. A recent cover of Der Spiegel shows a baby hoisting 16 old Germans on a barbell with the caption: "The Last German -- On the Way to an Old People's Republic." In Japan, the government half-seriously projects the date at which there will be only one Japanese citizen left alive. An important but limited exception to hyperaging is the United States. Yes, America is also graying, but to a lesser extent. We are the only developed nation with replacement-rate fertility (2.1 children per couple). By 2030, our median age, now 36, will rise to only 39. Our working-age population, according to both U.N. and census projections, will continue to grow throughout the 21st century because of our higher fertility rate and substantial immigration -- which we assimilate better than most other developed countries. By 2015, for the first time ever, the majority of developed-world citizens will live in English-speaking countries. America certainly faces some serious structural challenges, including an engorged health-care sector and a chronically low savings rate that may become handicaps as we age. But unlike Europe and Japan, we will still have the youth and fiscal resources to afford a major geopolitical role. The declinists have it wrong. The challenge facing America by the 2020s is not the inability of a weakening United States to lead the developed world. It is the inability of the other developed nations to be of much assistance -- or indeed, the likelihood that many will be in dire need of assistance themselves. A major reason the wealthy countries will need strong leadership are the demographic storms about to hit the developing world. Consider China, which may be the first country to grow old before it grows rich. For the past quarter-century, China has been "peacefully rising," thanks in part to a one-child policy that has allowed both parents to work and contribute to China's boom. But by the 2020s, as the huge Red Guard generation born before the country's fertility decline moves into retirement, they will tax the resources of their children and the state. China's coming age wave -- by 2030 it will be an older country than the United States -- may weaken the two pillars of the current regime's legitimacy: rapidly rising GDP and social stability. Imagine workforce growth slowing to zero while tens of millions of elders sink into indigence without pensions, without health care and without children to support them. China could careen toward social collapse -- or, in reaction, toward an authoritarian clampdown. Russia, along with the rest of Eastern Europe, is likely to experience the fastest extended population decline since the plague-ridden Middle Ages. Amid a widening health crisis, the Russian fertility rate has plunged and life expectancy has collapsed. Russian men today can expect to live to 59, 16 years less than American men and marginally less than their Red Army grandfathers at the end of World War II. By 2050, Russia is due to fall to 20th place in world population rankings, down from fourth place in 1950. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin flatly calls Russia's demographic implosion "the most acute problem facing our country today." If the problem isn't solved, Russia will weaken progressively -- raising the nightmarish specter of a failed state with nukes. Or this cornered bear may lash out in revanchist fury rather than meekly accept its demographic fate. Of course, some developing regions will remain extremely young in the 2020s. Sub-Saharan Africa -- which is afflicted with the world's highest fertility rates and ravaged by AIDS -- will still be racked by large youth bulges. So will several Muslim-majority countries, including Afghanistan, Iraq, the Palestinian territories, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen. In recent years, most of these countries have demonstrated the correlation between extreme youth and violence. If that correlation endures, chronic unrest and state failure could persist through the 2020s -- or even longer if fertility fails to drop. Many fast-modernizing countries where fertility has fallen very recently and very steeply will experience an ominous resurgence of youth in the 2020s. It's a law of demography that when a population boom is followed by a bust, it causes a ripple effect, with a gradually fading cycle of echo booms and busts. In the 2010s, a bust generation will be coming of age in much of Latin America, South Asia and the Muslim world. But by the 2020s, an echo boom will follow -- dashing economic expectations, swelling the ranks of the unemployed and perhaps fueling political violence, ethnic strife and religious extremism. These echo booms will be especially large in Pakistan and Iran. In Pakistan, the number of young people in the volatile 15- to 24-year-old age bracket will contract by 3 percent in the 2010s, then leap upward by 20 percent in the 2020s. In Iran, the youth boomerang will be even larger: minus 31 percent in the 2010s and plus 30 percent in the 2020s. These echo booms will be occurring in countries whose social fabric is already strained by rapid development. One teeters on the brink of chaos, while the other aspires to regional hegemony. One already has nuclear weapons, and the other seems likely to obtain them. All told, population trends point inexorably toward a more dominant U.S. role in a world that will need us more, not less. For the past several years, the U.N. has published a table ranking the world's 12 most populous countries over time. In 1950, six of the top 12 were developed countries. In 2000, only three were. By 2050, only one developed country will remain -- the United States, still in third place. By then, it will be the only country among the top 12 with a historical commitment to democracy, free markets and civil liberties. Abraham Lincoln once called this country "the world's last best hope." Demography suggests that this will remain true for some time to come.

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#### The affirmative is confined to the dominant discourse of transnational capital. The affirmative buys into a system which produces unethical policy based on the short term logic of growth. This causes economic crisis and environmental destruction

Makwana 06 (Rajesh, STWR, 23rd November 06, <http://www.stwr.org/globalization/neoliberalism-and-economic-globalization.html>)

Neoliberalism and Economic Globalization¶ The goal of neoliberal economic globalization is the removal of all barriers to commerce, and the privatization of all available resources and services. In this scenario, public life will be at the mercy of market forces, as the extracted profits benefit the few, writes Rajesh Makwana.¶ The thrust of international policy behind the phenomenon of economic globalization is neoliberal in nature. Being hugely profitable to corporations and the wealthy elite, neoliberal polices are propagated through the IMF, World Bank and WTO. Neoliberalism favours the free-market as the most efficient method of global resource allocation. Consequently it favours large-scale, corporate commerce and the privatization of resources.¶ There has been much international attention recently on neoliberalism. Its ideologies have been rejected by influential countries in Latin America and its moral basis is now widely questioned. Recent protests against the WTO, IMF and World Bank were essentially protests against the neoliberal policies that these organizations implement, particularly in low-income countries.¶ The neoliberal experiment has failed to combat extreme poverty, has exacerbated global inequality, and is hampering international aid and development efforts. This article presents an overview of neoliberalism and its effect on low income countries.¶ Introduction ¶ After the Second World War, corporate enterprises helped to create a wealthy class in society which enjoyed excessive political influence on their government in the US and Europe. Neoliberalism surfaced as a reaction by these wealthy elites to counteract post-war policies that favoured the working class and strengthened the welfare state.¶ Neoliberal policies advocate market forces and commercial activity as the most efficient methods for producing and supplying goods and services. At the same time they shun the role of the state and discourage government intervention into economic, financial and even social affairs. The process of economic globalization is driven by this ideology; removing borders and barriers between nations so that market forces can drive the global economy. The policies were readily taken up by governments and still continue to pervade classical economic thought, allowing corporations and affluent countries to secure their financial advantage within the world economy.¶ The policies were most ardently enforced in the US and Europe in the1980s during the Regan–Thatcher–Kohl era. These leaders believed that expanding the free-market and private ownership would create greater economic efficiency and social well-being. The resulting deregulation, privatization and the removal of border restrictions provided fertile ground for corporate activity, and over the next 25 years corporations grew rapidly in size and influence. Corporations are now the most productive economic units in the world, more so than most countries. With their huge financial, economic and political leverage, they continue to further their neoliberal objectives.¶ There is a consensus between the financial elite, neoclassical economists and the political classes in most countries that neoliberal policies will create global prosperity. So entrenched is their position that this view determines the policies of the international agencies (IMF, World Bank and WTO), and through them dictates the functioning of the global economy. Despite reservations from within many UN agencies, neoliberal policies are accepted by most development agencies as the most likely means of reducing poverty and inequality in the poorest regions.¶ There is a huge discrepancy between the measurable result of economic globalization and its proposed benefits. Neoliberal policies have unarguably generated massive wealth for some people, but most crucially, they have been unable to benefit those living in extreme poverty who are most in need of financial aid. Excluding China, annual economic growth in developing countries between 1960 and 1980 was 3.2%. This dropped drastically between 1980 and 2000 to a mere 0.7 %. This second period is when neoliberalism was most prevalent in global economic policy. (Interestingly, China was not following the neoliberal model during these periods, and its economic growth per capita grew to over 8% between 1980 and 2000.)¶ Neoliberalism has also been unable to address growing levels of global inequality. Over the last 25 years, the income inequalities have increased dramatically, both within and between countries. Between 1980 and 1998, the income of richest 10% as share of poorest 10% became 19% more unequal; and the income of richest 1% as share of poorest 1% became 77% more unequal (again, not including China).¶ The shortcomings of neoliberal policy are also apparent in the well documented economic disasters suffered by countries in Latin America and South Asia in the 1990s. These countries were left with no choice but to follow the neoliberal model of privatization and deregulation, due to their financial problems and pressure from the IMF. Countries such as Venezuela, Cuba, Argentina and Bolivia have since rejected foreign corporate control and the advice of the IMF and World Bank. Instead they have favoured a redistribution of wealth, the re-nationalization of industry and have prioritized the provision of healthcare and education. They are also sharing resources such as oil and medical expertise throughout the region and with other countries around the world.¶ The dramatic economic and social improvement seen in these countries has not stopped them from being demonized by the US. Cuba is a well known example of this propaganda. Deemed to be a danger to ‘freedom and the American way of life’, Cuba has been subject to intense US political, economic and military pressure in order to tow the neoliberal line. Washington and the mainstream media in the US have recently embarked on a similar propaganda exercise aimed at Venezuela’s president Chavez. This over-reaction by Washington to ‘economic nationalism’ is consistent with their foreign policy objectives which have not changed significantly for the past 150 years. Securing resources and economic dominance has been and continues to be the USA’s main economic objective.¶ According to Maria Páez Victor:¶ “Since 1846 the United States has carried out no fewer than 50 military invasions and destabilizing operations involving 12 different Latin American countries. Yet, none of these countries has ever had the capacity to threaten US security in any significant way. The US intervened because of perceived threats to its economic control and expansion. For this reason it has also supported some of the region’s most vicious dictators such as Batista, Somoza, Trujillo, and Pinochet.”¶ As a result of corporate and US influence, the key international bodies that developing countries are forced to turn to for assistance, such as the World Bank and IMF, are major exponents of the neoliberal agenda. The WTO openly asserts its intention to improve global business opportunities; the IMF is heavily influenced by the Wall Street and private financiers, and the World Bank ensures corporations benefit from development project contracts. They all gain considerably from the neo-liberal model.¶ So influential are corporations at this time that many of the worst violators of human rights have even entered a Global Compact with the United Nations, the world’s foremost humanitarian body. Due to this international convergence of economic ideology, it is no coincidence that the assumptions that are key to increasing corporate welfare and growth are the same assumptions that form the thrust of mainstream global economic policy.¶ However, there are huge differences between the neoliberal dogma that the US and EU dictate to the world and the policies that they themselves adopt. Whilst fiercely advocating the removal of barriers to trade, investment and employment, The US economy remains one of the most protected in the world. Industrialized nations only reached their state of economic development by fiercely protecting their industries from foreign markets and investment. For economic growth to benefit developing countries, the international community must be allowed to nurture their infant industries. Instead economically dominant countries are ‘kicking away the ladder’ to achieving development by imposing an ideology that suits their own economic needs.¶ The US and EU also provide huge subsidies to many sectors of industry. These devastate small industries in developing countries, particularly farmers who cannot compete with the price of subsidized goods in international markets. Despite their neoliberal rhetoric, most ‘capitalist’ countries have increased their levels of state intervention over the past 25 years, and the size of their government has increased. The requirement is to ‘do as I say, not as I do’.¶ Given the tiny proportion of individuals that benefit from neoliberal policies, the chasm between what is good for the economy and what serves the public good is growing fast. Decisions to follow these policies are out of the hands of the public, and the national sovereignty of many developing countries continues to be violated, preventing them from prioritizing urgent national needs.¶ Below we examine the false assumptions of neoliberal policies and their effect on the global economy.¶ Economic Growth¶ Economic growth, as measured in GDP, is the yardstick of economic globalization which is fiercely pursued by multinationals and countries alike. It is the commercial activity of the tiny portion of multinational corporations that drives economic growth in industrialized nations. Two hundred corporations account for a third of global economic growth. Corporate trade currently accounts for over 50% of global economic growth and as much as 75% of GDP in the EU. The proportion of trade to GDP continues to grow, highlighting the belief that economic growth is the only way to prosper a country and reduce poverty.¶ Logically, however, a model for continual financial growth is unsustainable. Corporations have to go to extraordinary lengths in order to reflect endless growth in their accounting books. As a result, finite resources are wasted and the environment is dangerously neglected. The equivalent of two football fields of natural forest is cleared each second by profit hungry corporations.¶ Economic growth is also used by the World Bank and government economists to measure progress in developing countries. But, whilst economic growth clearly does have benefits, the evidence strongly suggests that these benefits do not trickle down to the 986 million people living in extreme poverty, representing 18 percent of the world population (World Bank, 2007). Nor has economic growth addressed inequality and income distribution. In addition, accurate assessments of both poverty levels and the overall benefits of economic growth have proved impossible due to the inadequacy of the statistical measures employed.¶ The mandate for economic growth is the perfect platform for corporations which, as a result, have grown rapidly in their economic activity, profitability and political influence. Yet this very model is also the cause of the growing inequalities seen across the globe. The privatization of resources and profits by the few at the expense of the many, and the inability of the poorest people to afford market prices, are both likely causes.¶ Free Trade¶ Free trade is the foremost demand of neoliberal globalization. In its current form, it simply translates as greater access to emerging markets for corporations and their host nations. These demands are contrary to the original assumptions of free trade as affluent countries adopt and maintain protectionist measures. Protectionism allows a nation to strengthen its industries by levying taxes and quotas on imports, thus increasing their own industrial capacity, output and revenue. Subsidies in the US and EU allow corporations to keep their prices low, effectively pushing smaller producers in developing countries out of the market and impeding development.¶ With this self interest driving globalization, economically powerful nations have created a global trading regime with which they can determine the terms of trade.¶ The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the US, Canada, and Mexico is an example of free-market fundamentalism that gives corporations legal rights at the expense of national sovereignty. Since its implementation it has caused job loss, undermined labour rights, privatized essential services, increased inequality and caused environmental destruction.¶ In Europe only 5% of EU citizens work in agriculture, generating just 1.6% of EU GDP compared to more than 50% of citizens in developing countries. However, the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) provides subsidies to EU farmers to the tune of £30 billion, 80% of which goes to only 20% of farmers to guarantee their viability, however inefficient this may be.¶ The General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) was agreed at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994. Its aim is to remove any restrictions and internal government regulations that are considered to be "barriers to trade". The agreement effectively abolishes a government’s sovereign right to regulate subsidies and provide essential national services on behalf of its citizens. The Trade Related agreement on International Property Rights (TRIPS) forces developing countries to extend property rights to seeds and plant varieties. Control over these resources and services are instead granted to corporate interests through the GATS and TRIPS framework.¶ These examples represent modern free trade which is clearly biased in its approach. It fosters corporate globalization at the expense of local economies, the environment, democracy and human rights. The primary beneficiaries of international trade are large, multinational corporations who fiercely lobby at all levels of national and global governance to further the free trade agenda.¶ Liberalization¶ The World Bank, IMF and WTO have been the main portals for implementing the neoliberal agenda on a global scale. Unlike the United Nations, these institutions are over-funded, continuously lobbied by corporations, and are politically and financially dominated by Washington, Wall Street, corporations and their agencies. As a result, the key governance structures of the global economy have been primed to serve the interests of this group, and market liberalization has been another of their key policies.¶ According to neoliberal ideology, in order for international trade to be ‘free’ all markets should be open to competition, and market forces should determine economic relationships. But the overall result of a completely open and free market is of course market dominance by corporate heavy-weights. The playing field is not even; all developing countries are at a great financial and economic disadvantage and simply cannot compete.¶ Liberalization, through Structural Adjustment Programs, forces poorer countries to open their markets to foreign products which largely destroys local industries. It creates dependency upon commodities which have artificially low prices as they are heavily subsidized by economically dominant nations. Financial liberalization removes barriers to currency speculation from abroad. The resulting rapid inflow and outflow of currencies is often responsible for acute financial and economic crisis in many developing countries. At the same time, foreign speculators and large financial firms make huge gains. Market liberalization poses a clear economic risk; hence the EU and US heavily protect their own markets.¶ A liberalized global market provides corporations with new resources to capitalize and new markets to exploit. Neoliberal dominance over global governance structures has enforced access to these markets. Under WTO agreements, a sovereign country cannot interfere with a corporation’s intentions to trade even if their operations go against domestic environmental and employment guidelines. Those governments that do stand up for their sovereign rights are frequently sued by corporations for loss of profit, and even loss of potential profit. Without this pressure they would have been able to stimulate domestic industry and self sufficiency, thereby reducing poverty. They would then be in a better position to compete in international markets.¶

#### Economic threat predictions will cause the US to manipulate regimes in a non-democratic fashion---link turns the whole case and empirically kills millions

Neocleous, Prof of Gov, 8 [Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, *Critique of Security*, p95-]

In other words, the new international order moved very quickly to reassert the connection between economic and national security: the commitment to the former was simultaneously a commitment to the latter, and vice versa. As the doctrine of national security was being born, the major player on the international stage would aim to use perhaps its most important power of all – its economic strength – in order to re-order the world. And this re-ordering was conducted through the idea of ‘economic security’.99 Despite the fact that ‘econ omic security’ would never be formally deﬁned beyond ‘economic order’ or ‘economic well-being’,100 the signiﬁcant conceptual con sistency between economic security and liberal order-building also had a strategic ideological role. By playing on notions of ‘economic well-being’, economic security seemed to emphasise economic and thus‘human’ needs over military ones. The reshaping of global capital, international order and the exercise of state power could thus look decidedly liberal and ‘humanitarian’. This appearance helped co-opt the liberal Left into the process and, of course, played on individual desire for personal security by using notions such as ‘personal freedom’ and‘social equality’.101 Marx and Engels once highlighted the historical role of the bour geoisie in shaping the world according to its own interests. The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere . . . It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them . . . to become bourgeois in themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.102 In the second half of the twentieth century this ability to ‘batter down all Chinese walls’ would still rest heavily on the logic of capital, but would also come about in part under the guise of security. The whole worldbecame a garden to be cultivated – to be recast according to the logic of security. In the space of ﬁfteen years the concept ‘economic security’ had moved from connoting insurance policies for working people to the desire to shape the world in a capitalist fashion – and back again. In fact, it has constantly shifted between these registers ever since, being used for the constant reshaping of world order and resulting in a comprehensive level of intervention and policing all over the globe. Global order has come to be fabricated and administered according to a security doctrine underpinned by the logic of capitalaccumulation and a bourgeois conception of order. By incorporating within it a particular vision of economic order, the concept of national security implies the interrelatedness of so many different social, econ omic, political and military factors that more or less any development anywhere can be said to impact on liberal order in general and America’s core interests in particular. Not only could bourgeois Europe be recast around the regime of capital, but so too could the whole international order as capital not only nestled, settled and established connections, but also‘secured’ everywhere. Security politics thereby became the basis of a distinctly liberal philosophy of global ‘intervention’, fusing global issues of economic management with domestic policy formations in an ambitious and frequently violent strategy. Here lies the Janus-faced character of American foreign policy.103 One face is the ‘good liberal cop’: friendly, prosperous and democratic, sending money and help around the globe when problems emerge, so that the world’s nations are shown how they can alleviate their misery and perhaps even enjoy some prosperity. The other face is the ‘bad liberal cop’: should one of these nations decide, either through parliamentary procedure, demands for self-determination or violent revolution to address its own social problems in ways that conﬂict with the interests of capital and the bourgeois concept of liberty, then the authoritarian dimension of liberalism shows its face; the ‘liberal moment’ becomes the moment of violence. This Janus-faced character has meant that through the mandate of security the US, as the national security state par excellence, has seen ﬁt to either overtly or covertly re-order the affairs of myriads of nations – those ‘rogue’ or ‘outlaw’ states on the ‘wrong side of history’.104 ‘Extrapolating the ﬁgures as best we can’, one CIA agent com mented in 1991,‘there have been about 3,000 major covert operations and over 10,000 minor operations – all illegal, and all designed to disrupt, destabilize, or modify the activities of other countries’, adding that ‘every covert operation has been rationalized in terms of U.S. national security’.105 These would include ‘interventions’ in Greece, Italy, France, Turkey, Macedonia, the Ukraine, Cambodia, Indonesia, China, Korea, Burma, Vietnam, Thailand, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Bolivia, Grenada, Paraguay, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Philippines, Honduras, Haiti, Venezuela, Panama, Angola, Ghana, Congo, South Africa, Albania, Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and many more, and many of these more than once. Next up are the ‘60 or more’ countries identiﬁed as the bases of ‘terror cells’ by Bush in a speech on 1 June 2002.106 The methods used have varied: most popular has been the favoured technique of liberal security – ‘making the economy scream’ via controls, interventions and the imposition of neo-liberal regulations. But a wide range of other techniques have been used: terror bombing; subversion; rigging elections; the use of the CIA’s ‘Health Alteration Committee’ whose mandate was to ‘incapacitate’ foreign ofﬁcials; drug-trafﬁcking;107 and the sponsorship of terror groups, counterinsurgency agencies, death squads. Unsurprisingly, some plain old fascist groups and parties have been co- opted into the project, from the attempt at reviving the remnants of the Nazi collaborationist Vlasov Army for use against the USSR to the use of fascist forces to undermine democratically elected governments, such as in Chile; indeed, one of the reasons fascism ﬂowed into Latin America was because of the ideology of national security.108 Concomitantly, ‘national security’ has meant a policy of non-intervention where satisfactory ‘security partnerships’ could be established with certain authoritarian and military regimes: Spain under Franco, the Greek junta, Chile, Iraq, Iran, Korea, Indonesia, Cambodia, Taiwan, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Turkey, the ﬁve Central Asian republics that emerged with the break-up of the USSR, and China. Either way, the whole world was to be included in the new‘secure’ global liberal order. The result has been the slaughter of untold numbers. John Stock well, who was part of a CIA project in Angola which led to the deaths of over 20,000 people, puts it like this: Coming to grips with these U.S./CIA activities in broad numbers and ﬁguring out how many people have been killed in the jungles of Laos or the hills of Nicaragua is very difﬁcult. But, adding them up as best we can, we come up with a ﬁgure of six million people killed – and this is a minimum ﬁgure. Included are: one million killed in the Korean War, two million killed in the Vietnam War, 800,000 killed in Indonesia, one million in Cambodia, 20,000 killed in Angola – the operation I was part of – and 22,000 killed in Nicaragua.109 Note that the six million is a minimum ﬁgure, that he omits to mention rather a lot of other interventions, and that he was writing in 1991. This is security as the slaughter bench of history. All of this has been more than conﬁrmed by events in the twentyﬁrst century: in a speech on 1 June 2002, which became the basis of the ofﬁcial National Security Strategy of the United Statesin September of that year, President Bush reiterated that the US has a unilateral right to overthrow any government in the world, and launched a new round of slaughtering to prove it. While much has been made about the supposedly ‘new’ doctrine of preemption in the early twenty-ﬁrst century, the policy of preemption has a long history as part of national security doctrine. The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufﬁcient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves . . . To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adver saries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre emptively.110 In other words, the security policy of the world’s only superpower in its current ‘war on terror’ is still underpinned by a notion of liberal order-building based on a certain vision of ‘economic order’. The National Security Strategy concerns itself with a ‘single sustainable model for national success’ based on ‘political and economic liberty’, with whole sections devoted to the security beneﬁts of ‘economic liberty’, and the beneﬁts to liberty of the security strategy proposed.111

#### The impact’s is a confluence of crises that place the globe in jeopardy---the plan’s consolidation of neoliberal hegemony collapses democracy, causes resource wars, and environmental collapse

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The dominant economic model based on limitless growth on a limited planet is leading to an overshoot of the human use of the earth’s resources. This is leading to an ecological catastrophe. It is also leading to intense and violent resource grab of the remaining resources of the earth by the rich from the poor. The resource grab is an adjustment by the rich and powerful to a shrinking resource base – land, biodiversity, water – without adjusting the old resource intensive, limitless growth paradigm to the new reality. Its only outcome can be ecological scarcity for the poor in the short term, with deepening poverty and deprivation. In the long run it means the extinction of our species, as climate catastrophe and extinction of other species makes the planet un-inhabitable for human societies. Failure to make an ecological adjustment to planetary limits and ecological justice is a threat to human survival. The Green Economy being pushed at Rio +20 could well become the biggest resource grabs in human history with corporations appropriating the planet’s green wealth, the biodiversity, to become the green oil to make bio-fuel, energy plastics, chemicals – everything that the petrochemical era based on fossil fuels gave us. Movements worldwide have started to say “No to the Green Economy of the 1%”. But an ecological adjustment is possible, and is happening. This ecological adjustment involves seeing ourselves as a part of the fragile ecological web, not outside and above it, immune from the ecological consequences of our actions. Ecological adjustment also implies that we see ourselves as members of the earth community, sharing the earth’s resources equitably with all species and within the human community. Ecological adjustment requires an end to resource grab, and the privatization of our land, bio diversity and seeds, water and atmosphere. Ecological adjustment is based on the recovery of the commons and the creation of Earth Democracy. The dominant economic model based on resource monopolies and the rule of an oligarchy is not just in conflict with ecological limits of the planet. It is in conflict with the principles of democracy, and governance by the people, of the people, for the people. The adjustment from the oligarchy is to further strangle democracy and crush civil liberties and people’s freedom. Bharti Mittal’s statement that politics should not interfere with the economy reflects the mindset of the oligarchy that democracy can be done away with. This anti-democratic adjustment includes laws like homeland security in U.S., and multiple security laws in India. The calls for a democratic adjustment from below are witnessed worldwide in the rise of non-violent protests, from the Arab spring to the American autumn of “Occupy” and the Russian winter challenging the hijack of elections and electoral democracy. And these movements for democratic adjustment are also rising everywhere in response to the “austerity” programmes imposed by IMF, World Bank and financial institutions which created the financial crisis. The Third World had its structural Adjustment and Forced Austerity, through the 1980s and 1990s, leading to IMF riots. India’s structural adjustment of 1991 has given us the agrarian crisis with quarter million farmer suicides and food crisis pushing every 4th Indian to hunger and every 2nd Indian child to severe malnutrition; people are paying with their very lives for adjustment imposed by the World Bank/IMF. The trade liberalization reforms dismantled our food security system, based on universal PDS. It opened up the seed sector to seed MNCs. And now an attempt is being made through the Food Security Act to make our public feeding programmes a market for food MNCs. The forced austerity continues through imposition of so called reforms, such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in retail, which would rob 50 million of their livelihoods in retail and millions more by changing the production system. Europe started having its forced austerity in 2010. And everywhere there are anti-austerity protests from U.K., to Italy, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Iceland, and Portugal. The banks which have created the crisis want society to adjust by destroying jobs and livelihoods, pensions and social security, public services and the commons. The people want financial systems to adjust to the limits set by nature, social justice and democracy. And the precariousness of the living conditions of the 99% has created a new class which Guy Standing calls the “Precariate”. If the Industrial Revolution gave us the industrial working class, the proletariat, globalization and the “free market” which is destroying the livelihoods of peasants in India and China through land grabs, or the chances of economic security for the young in what were the rich industrialized countries, has created a global class of the precarious. As Barbara Ehrenreich and John Ehrenreich have written in “The making of the American 99%”, this new class of the dispossessed and excluded include “middle class professional, factory workers, truck drivers, and nurses as well as the much poorer people who clean the houses, manicure the fingernails, and maintain the lawn of the affluent”. Forced austerity based on the old paradigm allows the 1% super rich, the oligarchs, to grab the planets resources while pushing out the 99% from access to resources, livelihoods, jobs and any form of freedom, democracy and economic security. It is often said that with increasing growth, India and China are replicating the resource intensive and wasteful lifestyles of the Western countries. The reality is that while a small 3 to 4% of India is joining the mad race for consuming the earth with more and more automobiles and air conditioners, the large majority of India is being pushed into “de-consumption” – losing their entitlements to basic needs of food and water because of resource and land grab, market grab, and destruction of livelihoods. The hunger and malnutrition crisis in India is an example of the “de-consumption” forced on the poor by the rich, through the imposed austerity built into the trade liberalization and “economic reform” policies. There is another paradigm emerging which is shared by Gandhi and the new movements of the 99%, the paradigm of voluntary simplicity of reducing one ecological foot print while increasing human well being for all. Instead of forced austerity that helps the rich become super rich, the powerful become totalitarian, chosen simplicity enables us all to adjust ecologically, to reduce over consumption of the planets resources, it allows us to adjust socially to enhance democracy and it creates a path for economic adjustment based on justice and equity. Forced austerity makes the poor and working families pay for the excesses of limitless greed and accumulation by the super rich. Chosen simplicity stops these excesses and allow us to flower into an Earth Democracy where the rights and freedoms of all species and all people are protected and respected.

#### The alternative is a process of critique that challenges the ideology of capital by prioritizing human development over production

Lebowitz 07 (Michael A. Lebowitz is author of Beyond Capital: Marx’s Political Economy of the Working Class (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), Build It Now: Socialism for the Twenty-First Century (Monthly Review Press, 2006), and The Socialist Alternative: Real Human Development (Monthly Review Press, forthcoming in 2008). Portions of this essay were presented as “Going Beyond Survival: Making the Social Economy a Real Alternative” at the Fourth International Meeting of the Solidarity Economy, July 21–23, 2006, at the University of Sao Paulo, Brazil, “Venezuela: A Good Example of the Bad Left of Latin America”, <http://monthlyreview.org/2007/07/01/venezuela-a-good-example-of-the-bad-left-of-latin-america>,)

What constitutes a real alternative to capitalism? I suggest that it is a society in which the explicit goal is not the growth of capital or of the material means of production but, rather, human development itself—the growth of human capacities. We can see this perspective embodied in the Bolivarian Constitution of Venezuela—in Article 299’s emphasis upon “ensuring overall human development,” in the declaration of Article 20 that “everyone has the right to the free development of his or her own personality,” and in the focus of Article 102 upon “developing the creative potential of every human being and the full exercise of his or her personality in a democratic society.”¶ In these passages (which are by no means the whole of that constitution), there is the conception of a real alternative—an economy whose logic is not the logic of capital. “The social economy,” President Hugo Chávez said in September 2003, “bases its logic on the human being, on work, that is to say, on the worker and the worker’s family, that is to say, in the human being.” That social economy, he continued, does not focus on economic gain, on exchange values; rather, “the social economy generates mainly use-value.” Its purpose is “the construction of the new man, of the new woman, of the new society.”¶ These are beautiful ideas and beautiful words, but they are, of course, only ideas and words. The first set comes from a constitution and the second comes from the regular national educational seminar known as Aló Presidente. How can such ideas and words be made real? Let me suggest four preconditions for the realization of this alternative to capitalism.¶ (1) Any discussion of structural change must begin from an understanding of the existing structure—in short, from an understanding of capitalism. We need to grasp that the logic of capital, the logic in which profit rather than satisfaction of the needs of human beings is the goal, dominates both where it fosters the comparative advantage of repression and also where it accepts an increase in slave rations. (2) It is essential to attack the logic of capital ideologically. In the absence of the development of a mass understanding of the nature of capital—that capital is the result of the social labor of the collective worker—the need to survive the ravages of neoliberal and repressive policies produces only the desire for a fairer society, the search for a better share for the exploited and excluded: in short, barbarism with a human face.¶ (3) A critical aspect in the battle to go beyond capitalism is the recognition that human capacity develops only through human activity, only through what Marx understood as “revolutionary practice,” the simultaneous changing of circumstances and self-change. Real human development does not drop from the sky in the form of money to support survival or the expenditures of popular governments upon education and health. In contrast to populism, which produces people who look to the state for all answers and to leaders who promise everything, the conception which truly challenges the logic of capital in the battle of ideas is one which explicitly recognizes the centrality of self-management in the workplace and self-government in the community as the means of unleashing human potential—i.e., the idea of socialism for the twenty-first century.¶ (4) But, the idea of this socialism cannot displace real capitalism. Nor can dwarfish islands of cooperation change the world by competing successfully against capitalist corporations. You need the power to foster the new productive relations while truncating the reproduction of capitalist productive relations. You need to take the power of the state away from capital, and you need to use that power when capital responds to encroachments—when capital goes on strike, you must be prepared to move in rather than give in. Winning the “battle of democracy” and using “political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie” remains as critical now as when Marx and Engels wrote the Communist Manifesto. Consider these preconditions. Are they being met by the new Latin American governments on the left? On the contrary, for the most part, we can see the familiar characteristics of social democracy—which does not understand the nature of capital, does not attack the logic of capital ideologically, does not believe that there is a real alternative to capitalism, and, not surprisingly, gives in when capital threatens to go on strike.¶ “We can’t kill the goose that lays the golden eggs,” announced the social democratic premier of British Columbia in Canada (in the 1970s when I was party policy chairman). Here, crystallized, is the ultimate wisdom of social democracy—the manner in which social democracy enforces the logic of capital and ideologically disarms and demobilizes people.¶ Venezuela, however, is going in a different direction at this point. While the Bolivarian Revolution did not start out to build a socialist alternative (and its continuation along this path is contested every step of the way), it is both actively rejecting the logic of capital and also ideologically arming and mobilizing people to build that alternative.

### 1nc – da

#### Renewable energy skyrockets electricity prices – cost of production and transmission lines

Bryce 2012 (Robert, Senior Fellow @ Center for Energy Policy and the Environment - Manhattan Institute, "The High Cost of Renewable Energy Mandates," http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/eper\_10.htm)

Although supporters of renewable energy claim that the RPS mandates will bring benefits, their contribution to the economy is problematic because they also impose costs that must be incorporated into the utility bills paid by homeowners, commercial businesses, and industrial users. And those costs are or will be substantial. Electricity generated from renewable sources generally costs more—often much more—than that produced by conventional fuels such as coal and natural gas. In addition, large-scale renewable energy projects often require the construction of many miles of high-voltage transmission lines. The cost of those lines must also be incorporated into the bills paid by consumers.¶ These extra costs amount to a "back-end way to put a price on carbon," says Suedeen Kelly, a former member of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.[5] Indeed, with Congress unwilling to approve national carbon dioxide restrictions or renewable-energy quotas, the RPS mandates have become a sprawling state system of de facto carbon-reduction taxes.

#### High energy prices jack up food prices – means drastic cuts in food aid

Tom Capehart, Specialist in Agricultural Policy¶ Resources, Science and Industry Division, and ¶ Joe Richardson¶ Specialist in Domestic Social Policy¶ Domestic Social Policy Division, “Food Price Inflation: Causes and Impacts,” Congressional Research Service, April 10, 2008, <http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS22859_20080410.pdf>, accessed 10-25-2012.

Higher commodity and food prices reduce our ability to provide food aid to other¶ countries without additional appropriations. Food aid usually takes the form of basic food¶ grains such as wheat, sorghum, and corn, and vegetable oil — commodities critical to¶ developing-country diets. Since there is very little value added for these commodities,¶ shifts in prices translate directly into higher prices for food-insecure countries or reduced¶ food aid contributions per dollar spent. Also, higher energy costs have increased shipping¶ costs for both food purchases and food aid. Unlike some domestic nutrition programs,¶ foreign food aid is not adjusted to account for changing costs. After a long period of¶ declining food costs, developing countries are facing increased food import bills — for¶ some countries as high as 25% in 2007.¶ 13¶ The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has indicated that rising¶ food and fuel prices would result in a significant reduction in emergency food aid.¶ According to press reports in March 2008, USAID expects a $200 million shortfall in¶ funding to meet emergency food aid needs. For FY2008, Congress appropriated $1.2¶ billion for P.L. 480 food aid, the same as FY2007. For FY2009, the President’s budget¶ again requested $1.2 billion. In six out of ten years since 1999, supplemental funding for¶ P.L. 480 Title II food aid has been appropriated.¶ Last year, the U.N. World Food Program (WFP) estimated it would need $2.9 billion¶ to cover 2008 food aid needs. Recent commodity, energy, and food cost increases have¶ boosted this estimate to $3.4 billion. According to the WFP, the current price increases¶ force the world’s poorest people to spend a larger proportion of their income on food.

#### Food price spikes cause insecurity that causes global resource wars that escalate to nuclear war

Michael Klare (professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College in Amherst, Mass) March 11, 2006 “The Coming Resource Wars” http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Oil\_watch/ComingResourceWars.html

It's official: the era of resource wars is upon us. In a major London address, British Defense Secretary John Reid warned that global climate change and dwindling natural resources are combining to increase the likelihood of violent conflict over land, water and energy. Climate change, he indicated, "will make scarce resources, clean water, viable agricultural land even scarcer" -- and this will "make the emergence of violent conflict more rather than less likely." Although not unprecedented, Reid's prediction of an upsurge in resource conflict is significant both because of his senior rank and the vehemence of his remarks. "The blunt truth is that the lack of water and agricultural land is a significant contributory factor to the tragic conflict we see unfolding in Darfur," he declared. "We should see this as a warning sign." Resource conflicts of this type are most likely to arise in the developing world, Reid indicated, but the more advanced and affluent countries are not likely to be spared the damaging and destabilizing effects of global climate change. With sea levels rising, water and energy becoming increasingly scarce and prime agricultural lands turning into deserts, internecine warfare over access to vital resources will become a global phenomenon. Reid's speech, delivered at the prestigious Chatham House in London (Britain's equivalent of the Council on Foreign Relations), is but the most recent expression of a growing trend in strategic circles to view environmental and resource effects -- rather than political orientation and ideology -- as the most potent source of armed conflict in the decades to come. With the world population rising, global consumption rates soaring, energy supplies rapidly disappearing and climate change eradicating valuable farmland, the stage is being set for persistent and worldwide struggles over vital resources. Religious and political strife will not disappear in this scenario, but rather will be channeled into contests over valuable sources of water, food and energy. Prior to Reid's address, the most significant expression of this outlook was a report prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense by a California-based consulting firm in October 2003. Entitled "An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States National Security," the report warned that global climate change is more likely to result in sudden, cataclysmic environmental events than a gradual (and therefore manageable) rise in average temperatures. Such events could include a substantial increase in global sea levels, intense storms and hurricanes and continent-wide "dust bowl" effects. This would trigger pitched battles between the survivors of these effects for access to food, water, habitable land and energy supplies. "Violence and disruption stemming from the stresses created by abrupt changes in the climate pose a different type of threat to national security than we are accustomed to today," the 2003 report noted. "Military confrontation may be triggered by a desperate need for natural resources such as energy, food and water rather than by conflicts over ideology, religion or national honor." Until now, this mode of analysis has failed to command the attention of top American and British policymakers. For the most part, they insist that ideological and religious differences -- notably, the clash between values of tolerance and democracy on one hand and extremist forms of Islam on the other -- remain the main drivers of international conflict. But Reid's speech at Chatham House suggests that a major shift in strategic thinking may be under way. Environmental perils may soon dominate the world security agenda. This shift is due in part to the growing weight of evidence pointing to a significant human role in altering the planet's basic climate systems. Recent studies showing the rapid shrinkage of the polar ice caps, the accelerated melting of North American glaciers, the increased frequency of severe hurricanes and a number of other such effects all suggest that dramatic and potentially harmful changes to the global climate have begun to occur. More importantly, they conclude that human behavior -- most importantly, the burning of fossil fuels in factories, power plants, and motor vehicles -- is the most likely cause of these changes. This assessment may not have yet penetrated the White House and other bastions of head-in-the-sand thinking, but it is clearly gaining ground among scientists and thoughtful analysts around the world. For the most part, public discussion of global climate change has tended to describe its effects as an environmental problem -- as a threat to safe water, arable soil, temperate forests, certain species and so on. And, of course, climate change is a potent threat to the environment; in fact, the greatest threat imaginable. But viewing climate change as an environmental problem fails to do justice to the magnitude of the peril it poses. As Reid's speech and the 2003 Pentagon study make clear, the greatest danger posed by global climate change is not the degradation of ecosystems per se, but rather the disintegration of entire human societies, producing wholesale starvation, mass migrations and recurring conflict over resources. "As famine, disease, and weather-related disasters strike due to abrupt climate change," the Pentagon report notes, "many countries' needs will exceed their carrying capacity" -- that is, their ability to provide the minimum requirements for human survival. This "will create a sense of desperation, which is likely to lead to offensive aggression" against countries with a greater stock of vital resources. "Imagine eastern European countries, struggling to feed their populations with a falling supply of food, water, and energy, eyeing Russia, whose population is already in decline, for access to its grain, minerals, and energy supply." Similar scenarios will be replicated all across the planet, as those without the means to survival invade or migrate to those with greater abundance -- producing endless struggles between resource "haves" and "have-nots." It is this prospect, more than anything, that worries John Reid. In particular, he expressed concern over the inadequate capacity of poor and unstable countries to cope with the effects of climate change, and the resulting risk of state collapse, civil war and mass migration. "More than 300 million people in Africa currently lack access to safe water," he observed, and "climate change will worsen this dire situation" -- provoking more wars like Darfur. And even if these social disasters will occur primarily in the developing world, the wealthier countries will also be caught up in them, whether by participating in peacekeeping and humanitarian aid operations, by fending off unwanted migrants or by fighting for access to overseas supplies of food, oil, and minerals. When reading of these nightmarish scenarios, it is easy to conjure up images of desperate, starving people killing one another with knives, staves and clubs -- as was certainly often the case in the past, and could easily prove to be so again. But these scenarios also envision the use of more deadly weapons. "In this world of warring states," the 2003 Pentagon report predicted, "nuclear arms proliferation is inevitable." As oil and natural gas disappears, more and more countries will rely on nuclear power to meet their energy needs -- and this "will accelerate nuclear proliferation as countries develop enrichment and reprocessing capabilities to ensure their national security." Although speculative, these reports make one thing clear: when thinking about the calamitous effects of global climate change, we must emphasize its social and political consequences as much as its purely environmental effects. Drought, flooding and storms can kill us, and surely will -- but so will wars among the survivors of these catastrophes over what remains of food, water and shelter. As Reid's comments indicate, no society, however affluent, will escape involvement in these forms of conflict. We can respond to these predictions in one of two ways: by relying on fortifications and military force to provide some degree of advantage in the global struggle over resources, or by taking meaningful steps to reduce the risk of cataclysmic climate change. No doubt there will be many politicians and pundits -- especially in this country -- who will tout the superiority of the military option, emphasizing America's preponderance of strength. By fortifying our borders and sea-shores to keep out unwanted migrants and by fighting around the world for needed oil supplies, it will be argued, we can maintain our privileged standard of living for longer than other countries that are less well endowed with instruments of power. Maybe so. But the grueling, inconclusive war in Iraq and the failed national response to Hurricane Katrina show just how ineffectual such instruments can be when confronted with the harsh realities of an unforgiving world. And as the 2003 Pentagon report reminds us, "constant battles over diminishing resources" will "further reduce [resources] even beyond the climatic effects." Military superiority may provide an illusion of advantage in the coming struggles over vital resources, but it cannot protect us against the ravages of global climate change. Although we may be somewhat better off than the people in Haiti and Mexico, we, too, will suffer from storms, drought and flooding. As our overseas trading partners descend into chaos, our vital imports of food, raw materials and energy will disappear as well. True, we could establish military outposts in some of these places to ensure the continued flow of critical materials -- but the ever-increasing price in blood and treasure required to pay for this will eventually exceed our means and destroy us. Ultimately, our only hope of a safe and secure future lies in substantially reducing our emissions of greenhouse gases and working with the rest of the world to slow the pace of global climate change

### 1nc – manufacturing

#### 1 No Korea war

**Fisher 13** (Max, the Post's foreign affairs blogger. Before joining the Post, he edited international coverage for TheAtlantic.com, The Washington Post, “ Why North Korea loves to threaten World War III (but probably won’t follow through)”

But is North Korea really an irrational nation on the brink of launching “all-out war,” a mad dog of East Asia? Is Pyongyang ready to sacrifice it all? Probably not. The North Korean regime, for all its cruelty, has also shown itself to be shrewd, calculating, and single-mindedly obsessed with its own self-preservation. The regime’s past behavior suggests pretty strongly that these threats are empty. But they still matter. For years, North Korea has threatened the worst and, despite all of its apparent readiness, never gone through with it. So why does it keep going through these macabre performances? We can’t read Kim Jong Eun’s mind, but the most plausible explanation has to do with internal North Korean politics, with trying to set the tone for regional politics, and with forcing other countries (including the United States) to bear the costs of preventing its outbursts from sparking an unwanted war. Starting World War III or a second Korean War would not serve any of Pyongyang’s interests. Whether or not it deploys its small but legitimately scary nuclear arsenal, North Korea could indeed cause substantial mayhem in the South, whose capital is mere miles from the border. But the North Korean military is antiquated and inferior; it wouldn’t last long against a U.S.-led counterattack. No matter how badly such a war would go for South Korea or the United States, it would almost certainly end with the regime’s total destruction. Still, provocations and threats do serve Pyongyang’s interests, even if no one takes those threats very seriously. It helps to rally North Koreans, particularly the all-important military, behind the leader who has done so much to impoverish them. It also helps Pyongyang to control the regional politics that should otherwise be so hostile to its interests. Howard French, a former New York Times bureau chief for Northeast Asia whom I had the pleasure of editing at The Atlantic, explained on Kim Jong Il’s death that Kim had made up for North Korea’s weakness with canny belligerence: The shtick of apparent madness flowed from his country’s fundamental weakness as he, like a master poker player, resolved to bluff and bluff big. Kim adopted a game of brinkmanship with the South, threatening repeatedly to turn Seoul into a “sea of flames.” And while this may have sharply raised the threat of war, for the North, it steadily won concessions: fuel oil deliveries, food aid, nuclear reactor construction, hard cash-earning tourist enclaves and investment zones. At the risk of insulting Kim Jong Eun, it helps to think of North Korea’s provocations as somewhat akin to a child throwing a temper tantrum. He might do lots of shouting, make some over-the-top declarations (“I hate my sister,” “I’m never going back to school again”) and even throw a punch or two. Still, you give the child the attention he craves and maybe even a toy, not because you think the threats are real or because he deserves it, but because you want the tantrum to stop. The big problem here is not that North Korea will intentionally start World War III or a second Korean War, because it probably won’t. So you can rest easy about that. The big problem is that North Korea’s threats and provocations, however empty, significantly raise the risk of an unwanted war. The United States, South Korea and yes Pyongyang’s all-important ally, China, all have much more to lose in a regional war than does North Korea. It falls to those countries, then, to keep the Korean peninsula from spiraling out of control. Even if they don’t ultimately offer Pyongyang concessions to calm it down, as they have in the past, they’ve still got an interest in preventing future outbursts. Like parents straining to manage a child’s tantrum, it’s a power dynamic that oddly favors the weak and misbehaving.

#### 3 No US-China War

**Moss 13** (Trefor Moss, The Diplomat, 2/10/13, 7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go To War, thediplomat.com/2013/02/10/7-reasons-china-and-japan-wont-go-to-war/?all=true)

But if Shinzo Abe is gambling with the region’s security, he is at least playing the odds. He is calculating that Japan can pursue a more muscular foreign policy without triggering a catastrophic backlash from China, based on the numerous constraints that shape Chinese actions, as well as the interlocking structure of the globalized environment which the two countries co-inhabit. Specifically, there are seven reasons to think that war is a very unlikely prospect, even with a more hawkish prime minister running Japan: 1. Beijing’s nightmare scenario. China might well win a war against Japan, but defeat would also be a very real possibility. As China closes the book on its “century of humiliation” and looks ahead to prouder times, the prospect of a new, avoidable humiliation at the hands of its most bitter enemy is enough to persuade Beijing to do everything it can to prevent that outcome (the surest way being not to have a war at all). Certainly, China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, does not want to go down in history as the man who led China into a disastrous conflict with the Japanese. In that scenario, Xi would be doomed politically, and, as China’s angry nationalism turned inward, the Communist Party probably wouldn’t survive either. 2. Economic interdependence. Win or lose, a Sino-Japanese war woud be disastrous for both participants. The flagging economy that Abe is trying to breathe life into with a $117 billion stimulus package would take a battering as the lucrative China market was closed off to Japanese business. China would suffer, too, as Japanese companies pulled out of a now-hostile market, depriving up to 5 million Chinese workers of their jobs, even as Xi Jinping looks to double per capita income by 2020. Panic in the globalized economy would further depress both economies, and potentially destroy the programs of both countries’ new leaders. 3. Question marks over the PLA’s operational effectiveness.The People’s Liberation Army is rapidly modernizing, but there are concerns about how effective it would prove if pressed into combat today – not least within China’s own military hierarchy. New Central Military Commission Vice-Chairman Xu Qiliang recently told the PLA Daily that too many PLA exercises are merely for show, and that new elite units had to be formed if China wanted to protect its interests. CMC Chairman Xi Jinping has also called on the PLA to improve its readiness for “real combat.” Other weaknesses within the PLA, such as endemic corruption, would similarly undermine the leadership’s confidence in committing it to a risky war with a peer adversary. 4. Unsettled politics. China’s civil and military leaderships remain in a state of flux, with the handover initiated in November not yet complete. As the new leaders find their feet and jockey for position amongst themselves, they will want to avoid big foreign-policy distractions – war with Japan and possibly the U.S. being the biggest of them all. 5. The unknown quantity of U.S. intervention. China has its hawks, such as Dai Xu, who think that the U.S. would never intervene in an Asian conflict on behalf of Japan or any other regional ally. But this view is far too casual. U.S. involvement is a real enough possibility to give China pause, should the chances of conflict increase. 6. China’s policy of avoiding military confrontation. China has always said that it favors peaceful solutions to disputes, and its actions have tended to bear this out. In particular, it continues to usually dispatch unarmed or only lightly armed law enforcement ships to maritime flashpoints, rather than naval ships.There have been calls for a more aggressive policy in the nationalist media, and from some military figures; but Beijing has not shown much sign of heeding them. The PLA Navy made a more active intervention in the dispute this week when one of its frigates trained its radar on a Japanese naval vessel. This was a dangerous and provocative act of escalation, but once again the Chinese action was kept within bounds that made violence unlikely (albeit, needlessly, more likely than before). 7. China’s socialization. China has spent too long telling the world that it poses no threat to peace to turn around and fulfill all the China-bashers’ prophecies. Already, China’s reputation in Southeast Asia has taken a hit over its handling of territorial disputes there. If it were cast as the guilty party in a conflict with Japan –which already has the sympathy of many East Asian countries where tensions China are concerned – China would see regional opinion harden against it further still. This is not what Beijing wants: It seeks to influence regional affairs diplomatically from within, and to realize “win-win” opportunities with its international partners. In light of these constraints, Abe should be able to push back against China – so long as he doesn’t go too far. He was of course dealt a rotten hand by his predecessor, Yoshihiko Noda, whose bungled nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands triggered last year’s plunge in relations. Noda’s misjudgments raised the political temperature to the point where neither side feels able to make concessions, at least for now, in an attempt to repair relations. However, Abe can make the toxic Noda legacy work in his favor. Domestically, he can play the role of the man elected to untangle the wreckage, empowered by his democratic mandate to seek a new normal in Sino-Japanese relations. Chinese assertiveness would be met with a newfound Japanese assertiveness, restoring balance to the relationship. It is also timely for Japan to push back now, while its military is still a match for China’s. Five or ten years down the line this may no longer be the case, even if Abe finally grows the stagnant defense budget. Meanwhile, Abe is also pursuing diplomatic avenues. It was Abe who mended Japan’s ties with China after the Koizumi years, and he is now trying to reprise his role as peacemaker, having dispatched his coalition partner, Natsuo Yamaguchi, to Beijing reportedly to convey his desire for a new dialogue. It is hardly surprising, given his daunting domestic laundry list, that Xi Jinping should have responded encouragingly to the Japanese olive branch. In the end, Abe and Xi are balancing the same equation: They will not give ground on sovereignty issues, but they have no interest in a war – in fact, they must dread it. Even if a small skirmish between Chinese and Japanese ships or aircraft occurs, the leaders will not order additional forces to join the battle unless they are boxed in by a very specific set of circumstances that makes escalation the only face-saving option. The escalatory spiral into all-out war that some envisage once the first shot is fired is certainly not the likeliest outcome, as recurrent skirmishes elsewhere – such as in Kashmir, or along the Thai-Cambodian border – have demonstrated.

#### 4 No war – countries are hurrying to the Arctic to beat TREATY deadlines, not each other – which proves they’re cooperating

Keil 13 (Kathrin has Europe Director - Arctic Security, Cooperation, and Institutions, M.S. European Affairs (2009), Lunds Universitet, Sweden  
B.A. International Relations (2007), Technical University Dresden, Germany and is currently a PhD Candidate at the Berlin Graduate School for Transnational Studies(BTS) at the Freie Universität Berlin. She is writing her dissertation on the international politics of the Arctic, with a focus on international regimes and institutions in the areas of energy, shipping and fishing. She has a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from the Technische Universität Dresden and a Master of Science in European Affairs from Lunds Universitet in Sweden. Her fascination with the Arctic began during an internship at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP Berlin) in 2009, and continues in her doctoral research and frequent travel to the Scandinavian countries, http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2013/02/taking-stock-of-races-for-arctic.html)

[By Kathrin Keil](http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2011/01/kathrin-keil_01.html) Despite ever more frequent acknowledgement that violent conflict in the Arctic over its increasingly accessible resources is rather unlikely, there is still frequent talk about the ‘race for the Arctic’. This metaphor is more than a bit superficial; the following tries to shed some light on the ‘race’ going on in the Arctic. First, ‘race’ implies competition about something; someone is trying to achieve something before anyone else. In this case, one must ask who is competing or racing against whom. Who is running, and who is leading? In the media, one regularly comes across at least two interlinked Arctic ‘races’. One is the race for the right to determine certain sovereign rights in the Arctic, the other the race for Arctic resource development, predominantly the extraction of hydrocarbon resources. **Race for sovereign rights** The race to determine sovereign rights in the Arctic concerns mostly overlapping areas for jurisdiction over the Arctic coastal states’ extended continental shelves.[i] The US, Canada, Russia and Denmark have such overlapping claims in Arctic waters. But in fact, **countries are not racing against each other but rather against institutional deadlines set by the U**nited **N**ations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The crucial provision is to be found in Art. 4 of Annex II to the Law of the Sea Convention, which says that: *Where a coastal State intends to establish, in accordance with article 76, the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, it shall submit particulars of such limits to the Commission along with supporting scientific and technical data as soon as possible but in any case within 10 years of the entry into force of this Convention for that State.* Canada has to submit its evidence for the outer limits of its continental shelf by 2013, Denmark by 2014. Russia ratified the Convention in 1997 and submitted its claim to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in 2001. However, the submission was returned with the request for further information and evidence. Russia aims to resubmit in 2013 or 2014. Norway had its deadline in 2006 and the country did submit that year. With minor adjustments, the CLCS in 2009 included Norway’s request into its recommendations, adding three new areas to the Norwegian continental shelf.[ii] The US has not (yet) ratified UNCLOS and thus cannot submit to the CLCS. So while there is a certain race here to meet the deadline, the 18th Meeting of the State Parties to UNCLOS in 2008 made sure to take some speed and urgency out of the race. They decided that *the time period referred to in article 4 of annex II to the Convention […] may be satisfied by submitting to the Secretary-General preliminary information indicative of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles and a description of the status of preparation and intended date of making a submission in accordance with the requirements of article 76 of the Convention.[iii]* While this was adopted first and foremost to release pressure from developing countries with limited financial and technological resources and capacities, one could understand this rule to say, in essence, that no formal deadline for a full submission exists anymore.[iv] Additionally, the boundaries that are still disputed in Arctic waters are not relevant for the ‘race’ to complete the procedure set out in Art. 76 of UNCLOS. The CLCS will not rule on any area of overlap between countries. In other words, if zones of jurisdictional entitlement overlap, the *states* in question need to agree on a maritime boundary. The determination of the boundary is not achieved by submitting first or before someone else to the CLCS. There is further the question of whether a state might realistically be denied a submission to the CLCS after the 10-year deadline has passed. Given that the Convention remains silent on this issue, one could argue that there would be no legal consequences for a state which failed to make a submission to the CLCS. This is also supported by Art. 77 UNCLOS according to which *[the rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf] are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal State does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these activities without the express consent of the coastal State [and t]he rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any express proclamation.* In this view, the coastal state’s rights over its continental shelf are inherent; non-compliance with the 10-year deadline does not affect these rights.[v] That **there is** indeed **little evidence of any kind of ‘race’ when it comes to** the **determination of sovereign rights over** continental shelf areas is supported by the fact that **the Arctic** coastal states all appear to have taken their full allotment of 10 years (except Russia, who takes even more in total) to complete their submissions to the CLCS. Nor does there seem to be much hurry to solve outstanding disputes, although some movement has been discernable recently. It took Russia and Norway 40 years to come to an agreement on their maritime boundary in the Barents Sea; some movement has been reported as well on the US-Canada Beaufort Sea dispute and the Hans Island issue between Denmark and Canada.[vi] **Race for Arctic resource development** Many also talk about the ‘race for the Arctic’s resources’, mostly its oil and gas. But also here, it is difficult to assemble substantial evidence which might indicate an ongoing “race”. The example of Shell’s activities in the Alaskan Arctic in 2012 show that racing to develop offshore hydrocarbon resources is no sure bet; the project has been plagued by postponements, technological issues and the recent debacle in which the drilling rig Kulluk grounded off of an Alaskan island in rough weather. These are but some of many indications that that industry has far to go before it is ready to successfully and safely conduct Arctic offshore development in areas where development experience and infrastructure is scarce. Here, too, one must also ask: Who is racing against whom? When it comes to actual extraction activities in relatively unexplored areas like the waters off of Alaska and Greenland, companies are not exactly queuing for offshore projects or hurrying to develop their licences first. Statoil and Total are carefully watching Shell’s endeavours in Alaska and make the commencement of activities in their own Alaskan license areas dependent on the evaluation of the costs, risks and benefits and the overall success or failure of Shell’s development projects. Statoil has already postponed exploration for oil off the Alaskan coast until at least 2015.[vii] In sum, the **use of the ‘race’ metaphor to describe Arctic developments** is shallow and **has little empirical basis**. The continuing use of this metaphor is problematic. It encourages people to believe that there is a potentially dangerous and violent competition going on, and it distracts from much more acute questions and problems that face the Arctic’s inhabitants under rapidly changing conditions in the Arctic.

#### 5 No impact to heg – data

**Fettweis, 11** Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

Royal concludes negative **Royal 10** – director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense (Jedediah, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises”, published in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 217, google books)  
There is, however, another trend at play. Economic crises tend to fragment regimes and divide polities. A decrease in cohesion at the political leadership level and at the electorate level **reduces the ability** of the state to coalesce a sufficiently strong political base **required to undertake costly balancing measures** such as economic costly signals. Schweller (2006) builds on earlier studies (sec, e.g., Christensen, 1996; Snyder, 2000) that link political fragmentation with decisions **not to balance** against rising threats or to balance only in minimal and ineffective ways to demonstrate a tendency for states to 'underbalance'. Where political and social cohesion is strong, states are more likely to balance against rising threats in effective and costly ways. However, 'unstable and fragmented regimes that rule over divided polities will be significantly constrained in their ability to adapt to systemic incentives; they will be least likely to enact bold and costly policies **even when their nation's survival is at stake** and they are needed most' (Schweller, 2006, p. 130).

### 1nc – warming

#### 1 Environmental collapse doesn’t cause extinction – tech solves

**Science Daily 10**

Science Daily, reprinted from materials provided by American Institute of Biological Sciences, September 1, 2010, "Human Well-Being Is Improving Even as Ecosystem Services Decline: Why?", http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/09/100901072908.htm

Global degradation of ecosystems is widely believed to threaten human welfare, yet accepted measures of well-being show that it is on average improving globally, both in poor countries and rich ones. A team of authors writing in the September issue of BioScience dissects explanations for this "environmentalist's paradox." Noting that understanding the paradox is "critical to guiding future management of ecosystem services," Ciara Raudsepp-Hearne and her colleagues confirm that improvements in aggregate well-being are real, despite convincing evidence of ecosystem decline. Three likely reasons they identify -- past increases in food production, technological innovations that decouple people from ecosystems, and time lags before well-being is affected -- provide few grounds for complacency, however. Raudsepp-Hearne and her coauthors accept the findings of the influential Millennium Ecosystem Assessment that the capacity of ecosystems to produce many services for humans is now low. Yet they uncover no fault with the composite Human Development Index, a widely used metric that incorporates measures of literacy, life expectancy, and income, and has improved markedly since the mid-1970s. Although some measures of personal security buck the upward trend, the overall improvement in well-being seems robust. The researchers resolve the paradox partly by pointing to evidence that food production (which has increased globally over past decades) is more important for human well-being than are other ecosystem services. They also establish support for two other explanations: that technology and innovation have decoupled human well-being from ecosystem degradation, and that there is a time lag after ecosystem service degradation before human well-being will be affected.

#### 2 Warming won’t cause extinction

Barrett 07, professor of natural resource economics – Columbia University

(Scott, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods, introduction)

First, climate change does not threaten the survival of the human species.5 If unchecked, it will cause other species to become extinction (though biodiversity is being depleted now due to other reasons). It will alter critical ecosystems (though this is also happening now, and for reasons unrelated to climate change). It will reduce land area as the seas rise, and in the process displace human populations. “Catastrophic” climate change is possible, but not certain. Moreover, and unlike an asteroid collision, large changes (such as sea level rise of, say, ten meters) will likely take centuries to unfold, giving societies time to adjust. “Abrupt” climate change is also possible, and will occur more rapidly, perhaps over a decade or two. However, abrupt climate change (such as a weakening in the North Atlantic circulation), though potentially very serious, is unlikely to be ruinous. Human-induced climate change is an experiment of planetary proportions, and we cannot be sur of its consequences. Even in a worse case scenario, however, global climate change is not the equivalent of the Earth being hit by mega-asteroid. Indeed, if it were as damaging as this, and if we were sure that it would be this harmful, then our incentive to address this threat would be overwhelming. The challenge would still be more difficult than asteroid defense, but we would have done much more about it by now.

#### 3 CO2 isn’t key

Watts 12, 25-year climate reporter, works with weather technology, weather stations, and weather data processing systems in the private sector, 7/25/’12

(Anthony, <http://wattsupwiththat.com/2012/07/25/lindzen-at-sandia-national-labs-climate-models-are-flawed/>)

ALBUQUERQUE, N.M. — Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Richard Lindzen, a global warming skeptic, told about 70 Sandia researchers in June that too much is being made of climate change by researchers seeking government funding. He said their data and their methods did not support their claims. “Despite concerns over the last decades with the greenhouse process, they oversimplify the effect,” he said. “Simply cranking up CO2 [carbon dioxide] (as the culprit) is not the answer” to what causes climate change. Lindzen, the ninth speaker in Sandia’s Climate Change and National Security Speaker Series, is Alfred P. Sloan professor of meteorology in MIT’s department of earth, atmospheric and planetary sciences. He has published more than 200 scientific papers and is the lead author of Chapter 7 (“Physical Climate Processes and Feedbacks”) of the International Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Third Assessment Report. He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences and a fellow of the American Geophysical Union and the American Meteorological Society. For 30 years, climate scientists have been “locked into a simple-minded identification of climate with greenhouse-gas level. … That climate should be the function of a single parameter (like CO2) has always seemed implausible. Yet an obsessive focus on such an obvious oversimplification has likely set back progress by decades,” Lindzen said. For major climates of the past, other factors were more important than carbon dioxide. Orbital variations have been shown to quantitatively account for the cycles of glaciations of the past 700,000 years, he said, and the elimination of the arctic inversion, when the polar caps were ice-free, “is likely to have been more important than CO2 for the warm episode during the Eocene 50 million years ago.” There is little evidence that changes in climate are producing extreme weather events, he said. “Even the IPCC says there is little if any evidence of this. In fact, there are important physical reasons for doubting such anticipations.” Lindzen’s views run counter to those of almost all major professional societies. For example, the American Physical Society statement of Nov. 18, 2007, read, “The evidence is incontrovertible: Global warming is occurring.” But he doesn’t feel they are necessarily right. “Why did the American Physical Society take a position?” he asked his audience. “Why did they find it compelling? They never answered.” Speaking methodically with flashes of humor — “I always feel that when the conversation turns to weather, people are bored.” — he said a basic problem with current computer climate models that show disastrous increases in temperature is that relatively small increases in atmospheric gases lead to large changes in temperatures in the models. But, he said, “predictions based on high (climate) sensitivity ran well ahead of observations.” Real-world observations do not support IPCC models, he said: “We’ve already seen almost the equivalent of a doubling of CO2 (in radiative forcing) and that has produced very little warming.”He disparaged proving the worth of models by applying their criteria to the prediction of past climatic events, saying, “The models are no more valuable than answering a test when you have the questions in advance.” Modelers, he said, merely have used aerosols as a kind of fudge factor to make their models come out right. (Aerosols are tiny particles that reflect sunlight. They are put in the air by industrial or volcanic processes and are considered a possible cause of temperature change at Earth’s surface.) Then there is the practical question of what can be done about temperature increases even if they are occurring, he said. “China, India, Korea are not going to go along with IPCC recommendations, so … the only countries punished will be those who go along with the recommendations.” He discounted mainstream opinion that climate change could hurt national security, saying that “historically there is little evidence of natural disasters leading to war, but economic conditions have proven much more serious. Almost all proposed mitigation policies lead to reduced energy availability and higher energy costs. All studies of human benefit and national security perspectives show that increased energy is important.” He showed a graph that demonstrated that more energy consumption leads to higher literacy rate, lower infant mortality and a lower number of children per woman. Given that proposed policies are unlikely to significantly influence climate and that lower energy availability could be considered a significant threat to national security, to continue with a mitigation policy that reduces available energy “would, at the least, appear to be irresponsible,” he argued. Responding to audience questions about rising temperatures, he said a 0.8 of a degree C change in temperature in 150 years is a small change. Questioned about five-, seven-, and 17-year averages that seem to show that Earth’s surface temperature is rising, he said temperatures are always fluctuating by tenths of a degree.

#### 5 United States not key to solve warming and inevitable

Grose ‘13 (Thomas K., National Geographic News Writer, “As U.S. Cleans Its Energy Mix, It Ships Coal Problems Abroad”, March 15, 2013)

Ready for some good news about the environment? Emissions of carbon dioxide in the United States are declining. But don't celebrate just yet. A major side effect of that cleaner air in the U.S. has been the further darkening of skies over Europe and Asia. The United States essentially is exporting a share of its greenhouse gas emissions in the form of coal, data show. If the trend continues, the dramatic changes in energy use in the United States—in particular, the switch from coal to newly abundant natural gas for generating electricity—will have only a modest impact on global warming, observers warn. The Earth's atmosphere will continue to absorb heat-trapping CO2, with a similar contribution from U.S. coal. It will simply be burned overseas instead of at home. "Switching from coal to gas only saves carbon if the coal stays in the ground," said John Broderick, lead author of a study on the issue by the Tyndall Center for Climate Change Research at England's Manchester University. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) released data this week showing that United States coal exports hit a record 126 million short tons in 2012, a 17 percent increase over the previous year. Overseas shipments surpassed the previous high mark set in 1981 by 12 percent. The United States clearly is using less coal: Domestic consumption fell by about 114 million tons, or 11 percent, largely due to a decline in the use of coal for electricity. But U.S. coal production fell just 7 percent. The United States, with the world's largest coal reserves, continued to churn out the most carbon-intensive fuel, producing 1 billion tons of coal from its mines in 2012. Emissions Sink The EIA estimates that due largely to the drop in coal-fired electricity, U.S. carbon emissions from burning fossil fuel declined 3.4 percent in 2012. If the numbers hold up, it will extend the downward trend that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) outlined last month in its annual greenhouse gas inventory, which found greenhouse gas emissions in 2011 had fallen 8 percent from their 2007 peak to 6,703 million metric tons of CO2 equivalent (a number that includes sources other than energy, like methane emissions from agriculture). In fact, if you don't count the recession year of 2009, U.S. emissions in 2011 dropped to their lowest level since 1995. President Barack Obama counted the trend among his environmental accomplishments in his State of the Union address last month: "Over the last four years, our emissions of the dangerous carbon pollution that threatens our planet have actually fallen." The reason is clear: Coal, which in 2005 generated 50 percent of U.S. electricity, saw its share erode to 37.4 percent in 2012, according to EIA's new short-term energy outlook. An increase in U.S. renewable energy certainly played a role; renewables climbed in those seven years from 8.7 percent to 13 percent of the energy mix, about half of it hydropower. But the big gain came from natural gas, which climbed from 19 percent to 30.4 percent of U.S. electricity during that time frame, primarily because of abundant supply and low prices made possible by hydraulic fracturing, or fracking. The trend appears on track to continue, with U.S. coal-fired plants being retired at a record pace. But U.S. coal producers haven't been standing still as their domestic market has evaporated. They've been shipping their fuel to energy-hungry markets overseas, from the ports of Norfolk, Baltimore, and New Orleans. Although demand is growing rapidly in Asia—U.S. coal exports to China were on track to double last year—Europe was the biggest customer, importing more U.S. coal last year than all other countries combined. The Netherlands, with Europe's largest port, Rotterdam, accepted the most shipments, on pace for a 24 jump in U.S. coal imports in 2012. The United Kingdom, the second largest customer, saw its U.S. coal imports jump more than 70 percent. The hike in European coal consumption would appear to run counter to big government initiatives across the Continent to cut CO2 emissions. But in the European Union, where fracking has made only its initial forays and natural gas is still expensive, American coal is, well, dirt cheap. European utilities are now finding that generating power from coal is a profitable gambit. In the power industry, the profit margin for generating electricity from coal is called the "clean dark spread"; at the end of December in Great Britain, it was going for about $39 per megawatt-hour, according to Argus. By contrast, the profit margin for gas-fired plants—the "clean spark spread"—was about $3. Tomas Wyns, director of the Center for Clean Air Policy-Europe, a nonprofit organization in Brussels, Belgium, said those kinds of spreads are typical across Europe right now. The EU has a cap-and-trade carbon market, the $148 billion, eight-year-old Emissions Trading System (ETS). But it's in the doldrums because of a huge oversupply of permits. That's caused the price of carbon to fall to about 4 euros ($5.23). A plan called "backloading" that would temporarily extract allowances from the market to shore up the price has faltered so far in the European Parliament. "A better carbon price could make a difference" and even out the coal and gas spreads, Wyns said. He estimates a price of between 20 and 40 euros would do the trick. "But a structural change to the Emissions Trading System is not something that will happen very quickly. A solution is years off." The Tyndall Center study estimates that the burning of all that exported coal could erase fully half the gains the United States has made in reducing carbon emissions. For huge reserves of shale gas to help cut CO2 emissions, "displaced fuels must be reduced globally and remain suppressed indefinitely," the report said. Future Emissions It is not clear that the surge in U.S. coal exports will continue. One reason for the uptick in coal-fired generation in Europe has been the looming deadline for the EU's Large Combustion Plant Directive, which will require older coal plants to meet lower emission levels by the end of 2015 or be mothballed. Before that phaseout begins, Wyns says, "there is a bit of a binge going on." Also, economic factors are at work. Tyndall's Broderick said American coal companies have been essentially selling surplus fuel overseas at low profit margins, so there is a likelihood that U.S. coal production will decrease further. The U.S. government forecasters at EIA expect that U.S. coal exports will fall back to about 110 million tons per year over the next two years, due to economic weakness in Europe, falling international prices, and competition from other coal-exporting countries. The Paris-based International Energy Agency (IEA) calls Europe's "coal renaissance" a temporary phenomenon; it forecasts an increasing use of renewables, shuttering of coal plants, and a better balance between gas and coal prices in the coming years. But IEA does not expect that the global appetite for coal will slacken appreciably. The agency projects that, by 2017, coal will rival oil as the world's primary energy source, mainly because of skyrocketing demand in Asia. U.S. coal producers have made clear that they aim to tap into that growing market.

## 2nc

#### Must criticize and oppose neolib on the level of subjectivity – contesting policies isn’t enough

Read, 2009 (Jason, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southern Maine, “A Genealogy of Homo-Economicus: Neoliberalism and the Production of Subjectivity Jason Read,” Foucault Studies, no. 6, p. 35-36)

**Despite Negri’s tendency to lapse back into an opposition between labor and ideology, his object raises important questions echoed by other critics of neoliberal-ism.** What is lost in neoliberalism is the critical distance opened up between different spheres **and representations** of subjectivity**, not only the difference between work and the market, as in Marxism, but also the difference between the citizen and the economic subject, as in classical liberalism. All of these** differences are effaced as one relation; that of economic self-interest**, or competition, replaces the multiple spaces and relations of worker, citizen, and economic subject of consumption. To put the problem in Foucault’s terms,** what has disappeared in neoliberalism is the tactical polyvalence of discourse; everything is framed in terms of interests, freedoms and risks**.22 As Wendy Brown argues, one can survey the quotidian effects or practices of governmentality in the manner in which individualized/market based solutions ap-pear in lieu of collective political solutions: gated communities for concerns about security and safety; bottled water for concerns about water purity; and private schools (or vouchers) for failing public schools, all of which offer the opportunity for individuals to opt out rather than address political problems.23 Privatization is not just neoliberalism’s strategy for dealing with the public sector, what David Harvey calls accumulation by dispossession, but a consistent element of its particular form of governmentality, its ethos, everything becomes privatized, institutions, structures, issues, and problems that used to constitute the public.24 It is privatization all the way down. For Brown, neoliberalism entails a massive de-democratization, as terms such as the public good, rights and debate, no longer have any meaning. “The model neoliberal citizen is one who strategizes for her or himself among various social, po-litical, and economic options, not one who strives with others to alter or organize these options.”25 Thus, while it is possible to argue that neoliberalism is a more flexi-ble, an open form of power as opposed to the closed spaces of disciplines, a form of power that operates on freedoms, on a constitutive multiplicity, it is in some sense all the more closed in that as a form of governmentality, as a political rationality, it is without an outside. It does not encounter any tension with a competing logic of worker or citizen, with a different articulation of subjectivity. States, corporations, individuals are all governed by the same logic, that of interest and competition.** Foucault’s **development, albeit partial, of** account of neoliberalism as go-vernmentality has as its major advantage a clarification of the terrain on which neo-liberalism can be countered. It is not enough to simply oppose neoliberalism as ide-ology, revealing the truth of social existence that it misses, or to enumerate its various failings as policy. **Rather** any opposition to neoliberalism must take seriously its effectiveness, the manner in which it has transformed **work** subjectivity and social relationships**. As Foucault argues,** neoliberalism operates less on actions**, directly curtailing them,** then on the condition and effects of actions, on the sense of possibility. The reigning **ideal of interest and the** calculations of cost and benefit do not so much limit what one can do**, neoliberal thinkers are famously indifferent to prescrip-tive ideals, examining the illegal drug trade as a more or less rational investment,** but limit the sense of what is possible**. Specifically** the ideal of the fundamentally self-interested individual curtails any collective transformation of the conditions of existence**. It is not that such actions are not prohibited, restricted by the dictates of a sovereign or the structures of disciplinary power, they are not seen as possible, closed off by a society made up of self-interested individuals. It is perhaps no acci-dent that one of the most famous political implementers of neoliberal reforms, Mar-garet Thatcher, used the slogan, “there is no alternative,” legitimating neoliberalism based on the stark absence of possibilities. Similarly, and as part of a belated re-sponse to the former Prime Minister, it also perhaps no accident that the slogan of the famous Seattle protests against the IMF and World Bank was, “another world is possible,” and it is very often the sense of a possibility of not only another world, but of another way of organizing politics that is remembered, the image of turtles and teamsters marching hand and hand, when those protests are referred to.26** It is **also** this sense of possibility that the present seems to be lacking; it is difficult to imagine let alone enact a future other than a future dominated by interest **and the destructive vicissitudes of competition.** A political response to neoliberalism must meet it on its terrain, that of the production of subjectivity, freedom and possibility.

#### Structural violence outweighs – their threat discourse masks it

Jackson 12—Director of the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, the University of Otago. Former. Professor of International Politics at Aberystwyth University (8/5/12, Richard, The Great Con of National Security, http://richardjacksonterrorismblog.wordpress.com/2012/08/05/the-great-con-of-national-security/)

It may have once been the case that being attacked by another country was a major threat to the lives of ordinary people. It may also be true that there are still some pretty serious dangers out there associated with the spread of nuclear weapons. For the most part, however, most of what you’ve been told about national security and all the big threats which can supposedly kill you is one big con designed to distract you from the things that can really hurt you, such as the poverty, inequality and structural violence of capitalism, global warming, and the manufacture and proliferation of weapons – among others.¶ The facts are simple and irrefutable: you’re far more likely to die from lack of health care provision than you are from terrorism; from stress and overwork than Iranian or North Korean nuclear missiles; from lack of road safety than from illegal immigrants; from mental illness and suicide than from computer hackers; from domestic violence than from asylum seekers; from the misuse of legal medicines and alcohol abuse than from international drug lords. And yet, politicians and the servile media spend most of their time talking about the threats posed by terrorism, immigration, asylum seekers, the international drug trade, the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea, computer hackers, animal rights activism, the threat of China, and a host of other issues which are all about as equally unlikely to affect the health and well-being of you and your family. Along with this obsessive and perennial discussion of so-called ‘national security issues’, the state spends truly vast sums on security measures which have virtually no impact on the actual risk of dying from these threats, and then engages in massive displays of ‘security theatre’ designed to show just how seriously the state takes these threats – such as the x-ray machines and security measures in every public building, surveillance cameras everywhere, missile launchers in urban areas, drones in Afghanistan, armed police in airports, and a thousand other things. This display is meant to convince you that these threats are really, really serious.¶ And while all this is going on, the rulers of society are hoping that you won’t notice that increasing social and economic inequality in society leads to increased ill health for a growing underclass; that suicide and crime always rise when unemployment rises; that workplaces remain highly dangerous and kill and maim hundreds of people per year; that there are preventable diseases which plague the poorer sections of society; that domestic violence kills and injures thousands of women and children annually; and that globally, poverty and preventable disease kills tens of millions of people needlessly every year. In other words, they are hoping that you won’t notice how much structural violence there is in the world.¶ More than this, they are hoping that you won’t notice that while literally trillions of dollars are spent on military weapons, foreign wars and security theatre (which also arguably do nothing to make any us any safer, and may even make us marginally less safe), that domestic violence programmes struggle to provide even minimal support for women and children at risk of serious harm from their partners; that underfunded mental health programmes mean long waiting lists to receive basic care for at-risk individuals; that drug and alcohol rehabilitation programmes lack the funding to match the demand for help; that welfare measures aimed at reducing inequality have been inadequate for decades; that health and safety measures at many workplaces remain insufficiently resourced; and that measures to tackle global warming and developing alternative energy remain hopelessly inadequate.¶ Of course, none of this is surprising. Politicians are a part of the system; they don’t want to change it. For them, all the insecurity, death and ill-health caused by capitalist inequality are a price worth paying to keep the basic social structures as they are. A more egalitarian society based on equality, solidarity, and other non-materialist values would not suit their interests, or the special interests of the lobby groups they are indebted to. It is also true that dealing with economic and social inequality, improving public health, changing international structures of inequality, restructuring the military-industrial complex, and making the necessary economic and political changes to deal with global warming will be extremely difficult and will require long-term commitment and determination. For politicians looking towards the next election, it is clearly much easier to paint immigrants as a threat to social order or pontificate about the ongoing danger of terrorists. It is also more exciting for the media than stories about how poor people and people of colour are discriminated against and suffer worse health as a consequence.¶ Viewed from this vantage point, national security is one massive confidence trick – misdirection on an epic scale. Its primary function is to distract you from the structures and inequalities in society which are the real threat to the health and wellbeing of you and your family, and to convince you to be permanently afraid so that you will acquiesce to all the security measures which keep you under state control and keep the military-industrial complex ticking along.¶ Keep this in mind next time you hear a politician talking about the threat of uncontrolled immigration, the risk posed by asylum seekers or the threat of Iran, or the need to expand counter-terrorism powers. The question is: when politicians are talking about national security, what is that they don’t want you to think and talk about? What exactly is the misdirection they are engaged in? The truth is, if you think that terrorists or immigrants or asylum seekers or Iran are a greater threat to your safety than the capitalist system, you have been well and truly conned, my friend. Don’t believe the hype: you’re much more likely to die from any one of several forms of structural violence in society than you are from immigrants or terrorism. Somehow, we need to challenge the politicians on this fact.

#### Commodification causes exploitation and environmental destruction for capital accumulation---turns case

Jim Igoe et al 10, Assistant Professor of Anthropology at Dartmouth College, et al, June 2010, “A Spectacular Eco-Tour around the Historic Bloc: Theorising the Convergence of Biodiversity Conservation and Capitalist Expansion,” Antipode, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 486-512

Alliances of capitalism and conservation trade on, and are lubricated by, a number of overlapping currencies. By these we mean goods, symbols and indicators that can be shared by networks of conservation and commercial interests, and which are more effective in the production of conservation spectacle if they are shared. These currencies are protected areas, sovereignty and success. They overlap because each invokes, or requires the other, to work effectively. They are foundational the production of conservation spectacle.

Protected areas are among the most concrete, observable and comparable expression of the ways in which conservation and capitalism are remaking the world (Igoe and Brockington 2007; Brockington, Duffy and Igoe 2008). Since at least 1871, the year Yellowstone National Park was gazetted, the creation of protected areas has frequently entailed a radical separation of humans and nature (West, Igoe and Brockington 2006), which as Marx (1973 [1857–1861]) argued in the mid-nineteenth century was essential to the transformation of the natural world into objects of exchange. Specifically he argued that such transformations entail the erasure and concealment of the relationships of production from which such objects are created. He called this process fetishization. Through this process the attribution of value to a commodity is determined almost entirely by the logic of capitalist market processes. Within this logic, a commodity is valued in relation to its ability to provide returns on investment or to generate additional capital value, while other types of value based on socio-cultural factors or purely ecological criteria either fade into the background or disappear altogether.

Protected areas have been fetishized in some ways, in that their values are increasingly reduced to their ability to generate economic output and the relationships that created them are hidden from view (Carrier and Macleod 2005). This is not to imply that protected areas are only ever valued according to the logic of market processes. Though their potential market value has long motivated their creation, their creation has also been motivated by forces such as nationalist projects and the rise of ecological science. In the context of the political-economic processes unfolding since the late 1980s, however, different ways of valuing protected areas, and nature in general, have become increasingly correlated with nature's ability to generate wealth (Brockington, Duffy and Igoe 2008; Goldman 2005; Harvey 1996; McAffee 1999).

Whatever other values may come into play, however, mainstream conservation has always presented protected areas as having value that transcends all things. As Tsing (2005:97–99) argues, the worldview of early mainstream conservationists rested on the foundational belief that “nature, like god, forms the basis of universal truth, accessible through direct experience and study. To study a particular instance offers a window onto the universal.” From this perspective, an imagined planetary nature was thus enfolded into the appreciation of nature in any specific protected area.

This ability of one object (a park) to stand in for the whole of that class of objects (imagined universal planetary nature) is an essential element of Marx's (1978 [1865–1870]) theory of how commodities gain exchangeability. In the process the distinct features and relationships that characterize a particular object are significantly reduced in importance. Of course, the distinctiveness of a particular park is what gives it value as a particular destination. Indeed certain parks like Yellowstone and Serengeti are popularly regarded as unique and unparalleled portals to universal nature. In our current context, however, the specific quality of parks is overshadowed by their abstract quantity, as conservationists and policy makers seek to protect designated, but growing, percentages of the earth's surface. Protected areas’ great quality as a currency is that they are discrete, measured and eminently countable.

The inherent exchangeability of parks has become most salient as it is has intersected with the logic of exchangeability so pervasive in global neoliberalism. This is especially visible in mitigation policies, which assume degraded nature and environmental harm can be balanced by pristine nature and environmental protection. This allows the possibility of imagining the Earth as a virtual ledger, on which it possible to carry out a quantitative balancing of environmental goods and bads. A stark example is the creation of protected areas to mitigate ecological damage caused by large-scale extractive enterprise, such as the World Bank sponsored Chad–Cameroon oil pipline (Brockington, Duffy and Igoe 2008:3–4) and the massive World Bank sponsored Nam Theun hydro-electric project in Laos (Goldman 2005). It can also be seen in the increasingly popular idea that environmentally harmful carbon emissions can be offset through the protection of tropical rainforests, an idea now championed by Prince Charles and an expanding cadre of celebrity supporters.14 Finally, it can be seen in the US government's recent opening of a federal office to oversee trading in ecosystem services that will be similar in function to the Security and Exchange Commission.15 This will include overseeing the emergence of a new species credit trading scheme, in which species banks pay credit for the protection of endangered species and their habitats, which in turn can be purchased by corporations to “meet their mitigation needs” (Agius 2001; Bayon, Fox and Carrol 2007; Blundel 2006; Clark and Altman 2007; Etchart 1995; USDOI 2003).16

We believe that these transformations are part of the consolidation of the sustainable development historic bloc, since the concept of sustainability revolves around the possibility of trading ecological functions, services and values against ecological harm and risk (cf MacDonald this issue). Thus the paradoxes and ecological excesses of late market capitalism are recast as problems of management and the realization of market value. This recasting rests on the assumption that the quantification of nature's value, in terms of ecosystem services, is the key to financing the protection of that nature (Castree 2007; McAfee 1999; Sullivan 2009).17

#### The piece of Meacham evidence is about manufacturing in Mexico being productive because of the cost of labor – this notion destroys value to life — corporations will invest elsewhere because wages are orders of magnitude lower in Asia

Hart-Landsberg, 02 - December 2002 (Martin Hart-Landsberg teaches economics at Lewis and Clark college in Portland, Oregon. He is the coauthor, with Paul Burkett, of Development, Crisis, and Class Struggle: Learning from Japan and East Asia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), “Neoliberal Myth¶ A Critical Look at the Mexican Experience”, http://monthlyreview.org/2002/12/01/neoliberal-myths)

The best way to understand why Mexico’s working people have not benefited from their country’s recent growth is to study the operation of the country’s most dynamic exporters. These include the maquiladoras, foreign export platforms, and large private national exporters.¶ Maquiladoras: Maquiladoras are registered foreign-owned manufacturing firms (most of which operate along the U.S.-Mexican border) that are allowed to import inputs duty free because they export their entire output. In line with Mexico’s changing economic strategy, maquiladoras became increasingly central to the Mexican economy. Their exports grew by 17–20 percent a year from 1990 to 1997, with their share of total exports rising from 33.1 percent to 40.9 percent. Their share of total foreign direct investment rose from 6 percent in 1994 to 26 percent in 1999. By 2000, they were producing 47 percent of all exports and 54 percent of all manufactured exports.¶ This increase in economic activity was accompanied by a rapid increase in maquiladora employment, from 420,000 in 1990 to 1.3 million in 2000. This growth has taken place in the context of an overall decline in non-maquiladora manufacturing employment. Reflecting the austerity and market openings of the 1980s and mid-1990s, non-maquiladora manufacturing employment fell from 2.6 million in 1981 to 2.2 million in 1997.¶ While the maquiladoras have been celebrated by mainstream economists for anchoring Mexico’s economic transformation, Mexican workers have not benefited from the accompanying shift away from non-maquiladora production. Maquiladora workers receive wages considerably below those paid to non-maquiladora manufacturing workers. In 1994, average maquiladora wages were only 47 percent of non-maquiladora manufacturing wages. While the gap narrowed over the remainder of the decade, closing to approximately 80 percent, this trend did not represent an improvement for maquiladora workers. Rather, it was caused by non-maquiladora manufacturing wages falling at a faster rate than maquila wages. Maquiladora working conditions also remain poor. Turnover rates average between 15 percent and 25 percent of the labor force per month. The average work-life of a maquila worker is only ten years because of injuries, health problems, and the firing of women workers who become pregnant.¶ The problems with the maquiladora-based development process extend beyond wages and working conditions. As the New York Times explained:¶ All along the border, the land, the water, and the air are thick with industrial and human waste. The National Water Commission reports that the towns and cities, strapped for funds, can adequately treat less than 35 percent of the sewage generated daily. About 12 percent of the people living on the border have no reliable access to clean water. Nearly a third live in homes that are not connected to sewage systems. Only about half the streets are paved.4¶ Moreover, the maquiladoras continue to function as an enclave with few connections to the broader Mexican economy. Over 97 percent of their nonlabor inputs are imported from outside Mexico.¶ Foreign Export Platforms: Many foreign producers of manufactured exports did not go through the legal procedures required to register as maquiladoras. In most cases, their original investments were oriented towards the domestic market and/or their operations made significant use of local inputs. However, as a result of NAFTA and declines in the peso and Mexican wages, they have found it profitable to convert their operations into export platforms. While these foreign owned export platforms trail the maquiladoras in overall dollar value of exports, their share of total exports rose from 19 percent in 1993 to 26 percent in 1996.¶ Five foreign auto producers (GM, Ford, VW, Daimler-Chrysler, and Nissan) dominate this group. By the mid-1990s, they accounted for some 80 percent of foreign platform exports. In fact, the Mexican subsidiaries of GM, Ford, VW, and Daimler-Chrysler are the leading export companies in the country. There are those who argue that the growth of the auto sector represents the leading edge of Mexico’s transformation into a high-value-added producer of internationally competitive products. Some of the auto plants established in Mexico are indeed state of the art. However there is little evidence that these plants have made any significant contribution to worker well-being or the industrial upgrading of the Mexican economy.¶ Despite the fact the many of these modern auto plants have productivity levels comparable with those in the United States or Japan, Mexican workers receive wages far below their American and Japanese counterparts. In 1994, for example, General Motors paid its U.S. workers $19 an hour and its Mexican workers $1.54. Moreover, while productivity in the Mexican auto sector rose by 10.3 percent from 1994 to 1999, auto sector wages fell by 20 percent.¶ Although low wages led to numerous strike actions, corporations have resisted any improvements. In fact, according to a senior level manager at a U.S.-owned Mexican assembly and stamping plant, “It is the policy [of the parent company] and I guess of most every other company that does multinational business, to pay only at the prevailing wage of the area that they are in.”5 This statement is especially revealing since most state of the art plants were deliberately located in agricultural areas where wages were low.¶ Broader technological gains have also been limited. For example, the United Nations Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean reports that the “Mexican automotive industry is focused essentially on the North American market, is dominated by foreign companies and has limited national linkages”6¶ National Exporters: A number of Mexican-owned manufacturing firms, primarily the largest, have also become increasingly export oriented. And, like the foreign export platforms, their export orientation was largely motivated by Mexico’s post-1994 peso and wage collapse. Thus, the top thirty-four exporters increased their foreign-to-total sales ratio from an average of 12 percent over the years 1990–1994 to an average of 24.7 percent over the years 1995–1997. Mexico’s dominant national exporters have also established few linkages with other domestic firms. According to one scholar:¶ It is true that the major Mexican private exporters are still in the process of productive restructuring and have not yet reached a level of exports sufficient to offset the avalanche of imports that came with the economic opening. It is nevertheless troubling that the more than 13 years of decrees and programs designed to stimulate exports have not produced productive-export linkages sufficient to integrate many smaller firms into the new conditions of national and international competition.7¶ And, as these firms consolidate their export orientation and relationships with foreign producers, they are becoming increasingly hostile to national initiatives designed to boost the health of the broader national economy, including wages.¶ Export production by the maquiladoras, foreign export platforms and large national exporters has brought few if any benefits to Mexican workers because, as noted above, their operations have been promoted and sustained at the expense of the broader national economy. Even the World Bank has been forced to acknowledge that the Mexican growth strategy has produced a divided and disarticulated economy:¶ The productive sector continues to be characterized by a dual structure that seems to have become increasingly differentiated in the wake of trade liberalization and the banking crisis of the 1990s. On the one side is a dynamic export sector made up of internationally competitive firms, including the maquiladoras, and on the other is a less efficient domestic-market-oriented sector dominated by microenterprises and small- and medium-scale firms.8¶ This outcome has been actively encouraged by government policy. First, the government has done little to force or encourage exporters to create “productive linkages” with domestic firms. This is not accidental; Mexican policy makers seek to attract foreign export producers by giving them maximum freedom to organize production as they see fit. Second, the low wages paid to export workers, especially by the maquiladoras, continues to undermine domestic purchasing power and ensure that domestically oriented producers face limited markets. Again, these low wages are not an unintended consequence of government policy; the government has pursued a low wage policy precisely to ensure the profitability and expansion of the export sector.¶ Third, the collapse of the Mexican banking system has effectively limited the ability of domestically oriented producers, especially small and medium sized ones, to obtain needed funds for investment. The re-privatization of Mexico’s banks in 1991–1992 left the system under the control of leading Mexican business groups who engaged in a reckless funding of highly speculative and unstable activities. The 1994–1995 crisis brought an end to this activity, but left the Mexican banking system with a number of serious problems, including a “bad loan” portfolio equal to approximately 20 percent of the country’s GDP. The result, according to the World Bank, is that,¶ bank lending to the private sector has fallen since 1994 by about 40 percent in real terms, consumer credit by private banks all but disappeared…and the productive private sector itself became bifurcated between large, export-oriented corporations that can access foreign finance, and cash-constrained relatively smaller firms catering to the domestic market.9¶ Foreign capital was quick to take advantage of Mexico’s banking crisis. With the Mexican government’s encouragement, foreign investors began taking over Mexico’s main banks. By mid-2001, foreign-owned banks controlled more than 70 percent of the assets in Mexico’s banking system. It is highly doubtful that this foreign takeover will lead to new lending policies promoting the interests of domestically oriented producers.¶ Finally, even if one were willing to overlook the high cost and imbalances associated with Mexico’s export strategy, there is reason to question whether it can be sustained. As a result of the U.S. downturn, the Mexican economy contracted by 1.4 percent in 2001. Maquiladora production fell by 9.2 percent and maquila employment declined by some 20 percent. These declines have been widespread; even high-tech border production has suffered. More importantly, many business analysts predict that Mexico’s maquiladora sector will not regain its past dynamism even when the American economy recovers. According to Business Week, although Mexican wages “fell sharply in the age of the 1994 peso devaluation, wages in Mexico have been rising faster than inflation for the past two years. And since the peso has strengthened almost 5% against the dollar since January [2001], Mexico-based exporters are seeing local production costs increase.”10¶ Growing numbers of these exporters have responded to this situation by shifting their production to Asia, and especially China. As The Economist explains, “While the average labor cost for assembly plants in Mexico is now around $2 an hour, China’s figure is 22 cents. Although plants in Mexico are more sophisticated, the country has failed to develop a network of local suppliers that would make it hard for manufacturers to leave as the Chinese catch up.”11¶ So, even though Mexican wages still remain below their 1994 level, businesses in Mexico see the recent wage increase as unacceptable because there are other countries where workers will work for lower wages. This is a no-win situation for workers in Mexico as well as in Asia. It also makes crystal clear that neoliberalism is much more an ideological cover for a competitive race to the bottom than it is an economic approach capable of advancing a process of human development.

#### North Korea isn’t a threat – can’t attack the U.S. and don’t want to – our evidence cites someone who’s ACTUALLY SEEN their nuclear arsenal

**Demich 13** (Barbara has been nominated for the Pulitzer, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/14/world/la-fg-north-korea-nuclear-scientist-20130215)

PALO ALTO — Siegfried Hecker is a former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory and a professor at Stanford. But his knowledge of the North Korean nuclear program is not purely academic. He has visited North Korea seven times and toured the nuclear facilities. He even held a sample of North Korean-made plutonium (albeit well protected in a glass jar). In an email interview this week after North Korea's third nuclear test, he was asked a series of questions, including the most obvious: How worried should the United States be? Can North Korea threaten the American mainland with a nuclear weapon, especially with December's satellite launch? No, they have yet to demonstrate that they have developed an intercontinental ballistic missile. To do so would require much more flight-testing of their long-range missiles. In addition, the nuclear device would have to be very small and light, which would require additional nuclear tests. The nuclear warheads would also have to survive the demanding mechanical and thermal stresses of reentry into the atmosphere. Hence, they are many years away from threatening the United States; besides why would they want to strike the United States? It would be suicidal and the regime is not suicidal. Why did North Korea need to conduct a nuclear test at this time? What from a technical standpoint were they trying to achieve? With its limited nuclear test experience, North Korea needed a third test to demonstrate that it can miniaturize a nuclear device; that is, make it sufficiently small and light to mount on one of its missiles. This test may have given them the confidence to do so for one of their shorter-range missiles. The 2006 and 2009 tests demonstrated that North Korea can build a nuclear device, but that its nuclear arsenal is likely restricted to bulky devices that would need to be delivered by plane, boat or van, thereby greatly limiting their deterrent value. With a missile-capable nuclear device, [the government in] Pyongyang enhances the credibility of its deterrent. How can we tell if it was a plutonium or uranium bomb? Which one is potentially more worrisome? The seismic signals can only identify the size of the explosion, not its content or its sophistication. The gaseous fission products of the explosion provide different telltale signatures for highly enriched uranium and plutonium devices. However, these have to escape from the deep underground test cavity and be detected and analyzed very rapidly by airborne instruments or radiological monitoring stations around the world to allow conclusive identification. One has to be lucky to do so. Both plutonium and uranium bombs are worrisome. What is troubling about North Korea using highly enriched uranium is that we don't know how much it has and how much it might produce in the future because it is easy to hide its production facilities. In contrast, North Korea has very little plutonium, perhaps enough for four to eight bombs, and it is not making any more. Do you think there is a possibility of another nuclear test or two in the days to come? The regime of Kim Jong Un has threatened unspecified "second and third measures of greater intensity." These threats may be additional long-range missile tests, another nuclear test or both. I had considered it quite possible that they may conduct two nuclear tests simultaneously. Since they did not, they may have another nuclear device ready to test and they have another test tunnel, what we call the South Portal, ready to go. You were shown North Korea's centrifuges for enriching uranium in 2010. What was your impression of the state of the technology? Do you have any thought on how a country as poor and isolated as North Korea could have built such a facility? At the time was it your impression that the uranium program was for civilian purposes? In spite of their repeated denial of having a uranium enrichment program, I knew they had one. However, I was stunned at the size and sophistication of the 2,000-plus-centrifuge facility I was shown. It was another lesson that one should not underestimate the skill and determination of the North Koreans. They had developed these capabilities over at least a couple of decades with the help of a sophisticated, clandestine procurement network, significant help from Pakistan's A.Q. Khan, and great indigenous engineering skill. I believed the Yongbyon centrifuge facility was dedicated to making low-enriched uranium reactor fuel for its new experimental light-water reactor. However, I was also convinced that they had to have a covert facility and that facility was likely making highly enriched uranium bomb fuel. In addition, the Yongbyon facility can easily be converted from reactor fuel to bomb fuel production. Why did the North Koreans allow you see their nuclear facilities? Bragging rights? In order to open a door for negotiations? Have they now closed that door? I have been to North Korea seven times. Although they did not specifically say so, they had a message for me to deliver to the U.S. government each time. The first time, in 2004, when they let me hold the plutonium they had just made — I should add that it was well protected in a glass jar — the message was to tell the Bush administration that they have the bomb. I believe it was an attempt to negotiate, obviously with a trump card for their side. Unfortunately, they did not get the kind of response they wanted, so they went ahead and tested a bomb in 2006. When that one did not work so well, they greeted President Obama in 2009 with a second test that worked. Now they are greeting incoming South Korean President Park Geun-hye and a second Obama administration with the prospects that they may have miniaturized a nuclear device.

#### Be skeptical about their claims of China – it’s pure anxiety that causes conflict – only our questioning allows us to better understand the world

Pan, 12 - is prof of international relations at Australian National University and a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Deakin University (Chengxin, “GETTING EXCITED ABOUT CHINA”)djm

Certainly, policy debate often entails some level of emotion. The emotion surrounding White’s essay, however, seems to have set a new benchmark. The fact that it crosses personality and party divisions suggests that White has hit a raw nerve: the sacrosanct role of the US alliance in safeguarding Australia’s security and identity. On this matter of fundamental principle White is by no means naïve. He has admitted that his essay ‘touches none too gently on sensitive points which some people would rather leave undisturbed’.8 As a former defence adviser to two decidedly pro-US Labor politicians, Bob Hawke and Kim Beazley, he understands too well that for many, ‘the alliance is an end in itself, an object of loyalty, part of our identity’, so that ‘an Australia that abandoned the alliance would no longer be Australia’.9 But the US alliance is not the only sensitive nerve disturbed by White. Indeed, it would be difﬁcult to comprehend the emotional reactions to White’s essay without understanding the profound anxiety associated with Australia’s perceptions of China over the past century and a half, an anxiety that has continued to resonate in spite of the economic integration of recent years. China and an anxious nation: now and then Latent anxieties had been sharpened by a number of incidents in the months before White’s publication. Allegations of Chinese espionage in general and cyber espionage in particular were a recurring irritant. The extent of China’s inﬂuence on the Labor government, led by Mandarin-speaking Kevin Rudd, was also in question. In March 2009, Rudd’s ‘semi-secret meeting’ with Li Changchun, the politburo member in charge of propaganda, brought a storm of media attention. Then Opposition leader Malcolm Turnbull accused Rudd of being ‘a roving ambassador for China’, while his foreign affairs spokeswoman Julie Bishop stated that ‘I wouldn’t be the ﬁrst to call him the Manchurian candidate’.10 Then, in early June 2009, Joel Fitzgibbon stepped down from his position as Defence Minister after the revelation of his controversial links with the Chinese-Australian business- woman Helen Liu. At the same time, the British-Australian mining giant Rio Tinto pulled out of a deal with the state- owned Chinese company Chinalco, a deal which had already aroused suspicions about the reasons behind China’s bid to buy up Australian assets. Shortly after the aborted bid, the Chinese- born Rio Tinto (Shanghai) executive Stern Hu was arrested by Chinese authorities on charges of accepting bribes and stealing commercial secrets; again, the media went into a frenzy. While dismissing the Opposition’s criticisms as an attempt ‘to stir up some old “yellow peril” sentiments’, the Rudd government also seemed to get caught up in the sentiments.11 In a ham-ﬁsted attempt to counter suggestions that he was too close to the Chinese, Rudd requested that he not be seated next to former Chinese Ambassador to Australia Fu Ying during a BBC interview.12 Not all the incidents were so trivial, however. In the lead-up to the release of the government’s 2009 Defence White Paper, Rudd stressed the need for Australia to ‘have the right mix of capabilities’ in response to future contingencies, particularly in light of the region’s ‘substantial arms build-up’.13 Although Rudd did not directly point to China as the reason for the military build-up, analyst Nicholas Stuart notes that ‘it was difﬁcult to make sense of his com- ments in any other context’.14 This concern with China saw the White Paper set out more than $100 billion for the largest expansion in Australia’s naval and air war-ﬁghting capabilities since World War II. Meanwhile, as revealed in US diplomatic cables, the desire to contain Chinese inﬂuence also moti- vated Rudd’s seemingly innocuous Asia Paciﬁc Community initiative.15 Rudd’s concern about China was not just conﬁned to stra- tegic matters. On the eve of the Chinese Olympic torch relay team’s arrival in Canberra, Rudd vowed that Chinese security ofﬁcials would not be allowed to accompany the torch within Australia: a move earning him rare praise from conservative commentator Andrew Bolt: ‘Rudd won’t let Chinese invade’.16 Not long after, Rudd made it clear that his China anxiety extended to the economic front. He feared that Australia could be left behind in ‘a much more complex world than ever before’, as the dominance of the US and the UK was replaced by that of China and India.17 No doubt, Australia’s growing unease can be attributed partly to China’s meteoric rise and its uncertain ramiﬁcations, which created ‘a cauldron of anxiety’ in many places around the globe.18 Yet, in Australia, this anxiety continues to simmer despite a China-led resource boom that has helped deliver Australia’s best terms of trade since the middle of the last cen- tury. Indeed, few Western countries have beneﬁted more from Chinese economic development than Australia; and yet, few countries seem more suspicious and ambivalent about China.19 This reminds us of another puzzling paradox during the Cold War, when an Australian diplomat observed that ‘**Few Western countries have been** less **the target of Chinese hostility** than Australia’, yet ‘[f]ew countries, **West**ern or non- Western, **are more hostile to China** than Australia’.20 In this sense, Australia’s recent China syndrome can be understood as the latest manifestation of what David Walker refers to as Australia’s ‘periodic rediscovery of [its] proximity to Asia’, a place that has represented ‘a source both of fascination and anxiety’.21 This **anxiety has found expression in literary representations of Asian invasion**, a genre that depicted the ending, termination or disappearance of white society by one or other Asian society. Invasion ﬁctions collectively created ‘a detailed set of discourses centring on Australian vulnerability and Asian menace’.22 The anxiety about Asian invasion both feeds on and reinforces Australia’s state of mind as a defenceless ‘Western outpost on the fringes of a restless and aggressive Asia’,23 a tradition discussed in more depth by Greg Lockhart in this volume. This ‘indefensibility’ mantra has provided a starting point for Australia’s foreign policy over the course of the past century. It justiﬁes – indeed mandates – the need for a powerful friend to shield Australia from the Asian hordes. At the beginning of the twentieth century, to ease the national anxiety about a rising Japan, Prime Minister Alfred Deakin invited the US’s Great White Fleet to visit Australia in the hope that ‘England, America and Australia will be united to withstand yellow aggression’.24 Judging by the overwhelmingly enthusiastic public response to the ﬂeet visit, his initiative succeeded in capturing the national imagination. At the time, the Sydney Morning Herald predicted that the visit made it likely that ‘America may become our ﬁrst line of defence against Asia’.25 This view was reprised in the wake of World War II, when Robert Menzies stated that Australia could not ‘live without great and powerful friends in the world’.26 Australia’s affection for the US has always been premised on a subtext: Australia’s hold on the continent was insecure and if confronted by a serious challenge from Asia, Australian society would be – to use Menzies’s words – ‘blotted out of existence’.27 Although Japan (and to a lesser extent Indonesia) has served as a reliable threat over the years, the Asian menace has most frequently been symbolised by China, which was a favourite subject in numerous invasion novels and plays.28 Since Federation, China and the Chinese have served as a signiﬁcant Other against whom the Australian self has been constructed. As Helen Irving puts it, while there was doubt about the meaning of citizen- ship when Australia federated, there was one certainty amidst the doubt and that was that Australian citizens were not going to be Chinese. The Immigration Restriction Act made this clear. The Chinese were thus used to identify the type of citizenship the Australian nation would not embrace…‘The Chinaman’ was the starkest example of what ‘Australian’ was not.29 Stephen FitzGerald, Australia’s ﬁrst ambassador to the People’s Republic, also considered China a key symbol in Australia’s national imagination. As exempliﬁed by its central place in the adoption of the White Australia Policy, China ‘was a measure of where you stood on what mattered, on what you wanted for Australia’.30 Of course, the ‘Yellow Peril’ undertone has become less recognisable in contemporary Australian discourses of China. Some even suggest that Australia’s ‘visceral fear of its own geog- raphy’ has all but disappeared in the context of ever-deepening engagement.31 Still, old habits die hard. As Christine Sylvester illustrates, the 1994 Defence White Paper, written during one of Australia’s most ‘pro-Asia’ periods, ‘is full of wistful and nostalgic confessions of security among friends [and…] indulges in vague (post)colonial paranoia about “a region” it strives tol- erantly and opportunistically to befriend’.32 In this context, it is no surprise that Australia’s close economic ties with China have not been able to sway its historical mindset; if anything, this geo-economic proximity seems to have aggravated that anxiety. As the argument goes, Australia, held hostage to the Chinese economy, could become increasingly vulnerable to a downturn in China’s economic growth.33 Thus, it seems that at no time can Australian political elites afford to let go of the reassurance of the US alliance. Without a continued US presence, it is feared that a ‘more ﬂuid’ region would inevitably reassert itself, thereby leaving Australia exposed.34 The US alliance has been deemed so important to Australia’s sense of security that at times it turns into, rather ironically, an object of anxiety itself. For example, while reminding its Australian audience that the US would remain the most dominant power for the foreseeable future, the 2009 Defence White Paper nevertheless worried that ‘as other powers rise, and the primacy of the United States is increasingly tested, power relations will inevitably change’.35 In this appar- ently hard-headed ofﬁcial document, a sense of anxiety is in the air. And once again China lies at the heart of the new anxiety. It goes without saying that Sino-Australian relations have come a long way since the White Australia period. Over the past two decades especially, the bilateral relationship has been broadened and deepened on many fronts, ranging from regional security, strategic dialogue, trade and investment to human rights, climate change, education, culture, and people-to- people ties. However, despite such progress, the current debate continues to be mired in Australia’s historical anxiety about its region in general and China in particular. White’s Australia vs. White Australia Hugh White has not been immune from the inﬂuence of the past: he shares some of the trepidation about Asia and Australia’s place within it, and makes no secret of his preference for continued US primacy, although he thinks such uncontested primacy is increasingly hard to come by. He is thus realistic enough to recognise that in today’s rapidly changing strategic setting, ‘the idea of the Anglosphere – an alliance based on culture, or indeed on race’ has become ‘a relic of history’.36 It is because of this that he thinks Australia should be ready for pragmatic adjustments to the regional power shift. Others are not so sure. As Malcolm Cook points out, ‘Hugh’s Australia (and its place in Asia’s strategic order) is not the one I think I live in’.37 Many continue to hold steadfastly – although usually surreptitiously – to a lingering sense of Asia anxiety. For them, the Concert of Europe model proposed by White cannot be applied to China: the implication being that an Asian power, and an authoritarian one at that, could not be trusted to share power. Others simply dismiss the signiﬁcance of China’s rise. Carl Ungerer, Director of the National Security Project at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, argues that China is no great power: only the US is worthy of that title.38 His views are shared by Leader of the Opposition Tony Abbott, whose book Battlelines claims that in 2020, ‘the United States will still have the world’s strongest economy by far,’ and China’s rise ‘may not mean much change for Australia’s international relationships or foreign policy priorities’.39 While in ofﬁce, John Howard professed to have struck the right balance. Never questioning the centrality of the US alliance yet clearly recognising China’s growing economic importance, the then Prime Minister, in his characteristically canny style, insisted that ‘we do not face a choice between our history and our geography’.40 By the time Rudd came to power, such comforting optimism had begun to unravel. To Rudd, history offered few promising examples of peaceful power transition and accommodation among great powers.41 With the global ﬁnancial crisis further exposing the depth of both American economic woes and Australia’s economic depend- ence on China, the hitherto comfortable equilibrium between American reassurance and Asian anxiety looked less certain. With no easy way out of this strategic quandary, it is perhaps not surprising that Howard was ‘evasive’ about US-China relations, and Rudd was ‘unwilling to explain’ to Australians what all this meant.42 Dissatisﬁed with both Howard’s and Rudd’s approaches, White believes that refusing to confront the issue will only make it worse. But the intense debate surrounding his essay demonstrates that he still has plenty of convincing to do. This debate is a testament to the long historical shadow of Australia’s troubled relationship with the region. Just as ‘White Australia’ could not occur without a preoccupation with the immigration challenge of non-whites, the continued appetite for the US alliance is never far removed from the lingering strategic concern with Asia/China. In this sense, the raw nerve of the US alliance and the touchy issue of China are two sides of the same coin. To be sure, Australia is not alone in feeling apprehensive about the implications of China’s rise. Rather, this is a particular sub- set of a wider Western anxiety. Obama’s 2011 visit to Australia and the announcement of increased US military presence in Australia are only one signal of a trans-Paciﬁc convergence of fears about China. This initiative also reﬂects the centrality of this fear to the US-Australia alliance. But **fear cannot serve as a solid foundation for understanding a complex country such as China**, let alone for dealing with it in the new century. **It obscures more than it reveals about China, and when translated into policy, fear runs the risk of becoming a self-fulﬁlling prophecy**. Given Australia’s geographical location and the scale of its economic interdependence with China, the stakes are high for Australia to get its China debate right. Hugh White is correct in urging his fellow citizens to take up this challenge. But the question is: How? For a start, the antidote to anxiety about China is not the imagery of the ‘China opportunity’. As much as the latter might help allay Australia’s sense of anxiety, this way of framing China is underpinned by another set of colonial desires, namely fantasy. Whether expressed in economic or political terms, the ‘China opportunity’ imagery is an illusion, which may eventually result in disillusionment and even fear. Thus it does not provide a better alternative, but rather a new set of pitfalls.43 Another alter- native is to foster Asia literacy and develop ‘a more sophisticated way of understanding today’s China’.44 Australia is the third most monolingual developed country in the world, with 78.4 per cent of Australians claiming to speak English only.45 At Year 12, less than ﬁve per cent of Australian students are studying an Asian language, and more than 95 per cent of those studying Chinese are of Chinese ethnic background.46 Commenting on Stephen Smith’s statement that ‘We have to make Australia’s understanding of Asia literacy and Asian culture almost second nature to us’, Johnson, Ahluwalia and McCarthy note that ‘It is a sign of how little this has happened, and how Amero- and Eurocentric Australia still is, that Rudd’s Mandarin-speaking ability is seen as so extraordinary’.47 And yet, the fact that Australia has been grappling with its Asia literacy for much of the past three decades – if not longer – suggests that the problem is deeper than a lack of funding or resources. Rather than trying to remedy the symptoms of Australia’s Asia illiteracy, we **need to get to the core of the problem**. And the **problem**, as I have argued, **lies in** Australia’s longstanding Asia **anxiety, and its institutional embodiment** in the Australia-US alliance. Taking comfort from this insur- ance policy, until recently Australia in general and its foreign policy community in particular have not felt the need, let alone urgency, to know Asia beyond a few convenient shorthand imageries. Asia, as some (including historian J. A. La Nauze) had assumed, could be indeﬁnitely put off as ‘a question of the future’.48 A cumulative effect of this constant postponement of getting to know Asia is evident in Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s repeated reference to the ‘new’ Asia and the ‘new’ China: in short, ‘we haven’t been here before’.49 This ‘newness’ about Asia and China might help spark a new interest in the region, which in turn could translate into increased Asia literacy. However, so long as Australia continues to shun a critical reﬂection on its Asia anxiety, it is doubtful whether the narrowly-conceived Asia literacy program could take us very far. After all, although Rudd is frequently viewed as one of the most China-literate politicians in the Western world, it was during his brief reign as Prime Minister that frictions in Australia-China relations began to intensify, driving home the point that knowledge of Chinese language and culture alone does not automatically translate into a better understanding of China.50 What we need is a critical examination of Australia’s self-identity and self-knowledge as manifested in its historical construction of an Asian/Chinese Other. Michael Dutton and Deborah Kessler argue that any new Asia literacy program needs to go beyond merely adding the teaching of languages and culture to the school curriculum; rather, it requires confronting ‘a traditional Australian style of thought that is still unconsciously mired in some of the values of white Australia’.51 The China debate has been hamstrung precisely by this traditional style of thought, and thus rethinking Australia’s unconscious Asian anxiety should form an integral part of Asia/China literacy. For this reason, the **silent presence of Asia anxiety in the debate should be recognised and debated, rather than postponed**, in White’s own words, as ‘a debate for another time’.52 To those who are understandably curious about alternative ways of knowing China, a resort to critical self-reﬂection may sound rather hollow and evasive. But I suggest that this is any- thing but the case. **We see others not as they are, but as** we are and as **what we want them to be**. What Australians refer to as ‘Asia’ or ‘China’ is not Asia or China per se, but always Australia’s Asia or Australia’s China. **No one** visits or **studies China ‘as entirely a stranger: we already know or think we know what is to be expected’.**53 In other words, we always bring to the enterprise of understanding China certain fore-understandings, which are intimately linked to our self-knowledge. Western perceptions of China as a threat cannot be disconnected from Western self- experience, as evidenced in the discourses of ‘power transition’ and ‘democratic peace’. Similarly, Australia’s China anxiety is to a large extent bound up with Australia’s self-imagination as an innocent and vulnerable middle power culturally and politically different from its region. It is this taken-for-granted self-fashioning that has allowed people to tautologically assert, as a matter of fact, that we are wary of China because it causes us anxiety. **Unless we question this self-knowledge, no amount of new empirical facts about a ‘real’ China will be sufﬁcient to cast off** the **emotional foundation upon which our** contemporary **China knowledge is largely based**. To better understand China, as well as conduct critical self- reﬂection, we need to attentively listen to Chinese voices and come to terms with Chinese subjectivities. It is not necessarily wrong to be anxious about China’s rise, but it is problematic to uncritically privilege our anxiety and at the same time remain indifferent to and ignorant of China’s point of view and its concerns. Although we should never simply take Chinese dis- courses at face value, we do need to hold them as a mirror for our self-reﬂection. For example, amidst the latest euphoria about the US’s return to Asia and its renewed attention to Australian alliance, it is easy to forget or even to dismiss what reactions China or other Asian countries might have. Yet, until we take Chinese responses seriously and, if necessary, adjust our policies with this knowledge in hand, we are in danger of actually alienating China, and possibly forcing it to take some counter- measures. **By neglecting** the Chinese point of view, **we are** thus **prolonging the cycle of anxiety, and increasing the danger of the self-fulﬁlling prophecy**. Certainly Australia is not solely to blame for its troubled relationship with Beijing. For its part, China holds some simi- larly questionable and simplistic stereotypes about Australia and Australians, who are often portrayed as distant, uncultured, and blissfully ignorant.54 Few Chinese have paid adequate attention to Australia except as a destination for tourism, migration, or education, or as a source of raw resources. Even fewer have taken notice of, let alone understand, Australia’s concerns about the rise of China. Indeed, thus far there has been no direct engagement with White’s essay in Chinese media or foreign policy journals. And despite (or because of) this lack of Chinese interest in Australia, various hopes have been projected onto the country, ranging from the hope that China and Australia could develop a ‘model relationship’ to the myth that Rudd was a China hand (Zhongguo tong) with a China complex (Zhongguo qingjie) that would help strengthen Australia-China understanding.55 Such wishful thinking, harmless though it may sound, has not helped deepen Chinese understanding of Australia or, for that matter, soothe Australia’s China anxiety. In summary, at the heart of the China debate is a broader challenge of ongoing intercultural understanding in interna- tional relations. The debate sparked by White’s essay provides a valuable opening for undertaking such understanding and dia- logue. But contrary to White’s belief, it would take more than just a matter of ‘power shift’ to shift the power of entrenched anxiety. A concurrent, more fundamental debate should begin over the problematic historical conﬁgurations of Australian (and Asian) identity and difference. Historians of Australia-Asia relations – both here and abroad – **have a responsibility to be more actively involved in** the contemporary **debate**, to remind Australians that this is but one of ‘many points at which Asia was introduced into speculations about Australia’s future’.56 Meanwhile, strategic analysts and international relations scholars equally need to engage more closely and critically with history in general and with Australia’s Asian pasts in particular. No doubt scrutinising this sensitive nerve will be difﬁcult and at times traumatic. But without this long overdue reﬂection, the seemingly distant excitement of the Australian crowd lining up to welcome the Great White Fleet more than a century ago will likely continue to resonate.

#### Zero chance of Arctic war---experts

Mahony 13 Honor, EU Observer, "Fear of Arctic conflict are 'overblown'", 2013, euobserver.com/foreign/119479

The Arctic has become a new frontier in international relations, but fear of potential conflict in the resource-rich region is overblown, say experts.¶ For long a mystery because of its general impenetrability, melting ice caps are revealing more and more of the Arctic region to scientists, researchers and industry.¶ Climate change experts can take a more precise look at a what global warming is doing to the planet, shipping trade routes once considered unthinkable are now possible, and governments and businesses are in thrall to the potential exploitation of coal, iron, rare earths and oil.¶ The interest is reflected in the growing list of those wanting to have a foot in the Arctic council, a forum of eight countries with territory in the polar region.¶ While the US, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Russia and Canada form the council, the EU commission, China, India, South Korea and Japan have all expressed an interest in having a permanent observer status.¶ "The Arctic has become a new meeting place for America, Europe and the Asia Pacific," says Damien Degeorges, founder of the Arctic Policy and Economic Forum.¶ During a recent conference on Arctic shipping routes in the European Parliament, Degeorges noted that "China has been the most active by far in the last years."¶ He points to its red-carpet treatment of politicians from Greenland, a territory that recently got full control over its wealth of natural resources. Bejing also cosied up to Iceland after the island's financial meltdown. The two undertook a joint expedition to the North Pole and the Chinese have the largest foreign embassy in Reykjavik.¶ Meanwhile, South Korea's president visited Greenland last year and shipping hubs like Singapore are holding Arctic conferences.¶ The interest is being spurred by melting icebergs.¶ Last year saw a record low of multi-year ice - permanent ice - in the polar sea. This means greater shipping and mineral exploitation potential. There were 37 transits of the North East Passage (NEP), running from the Atlantic to the Pacific along the top of Russia, in 2011. This rose to 47 in 2012.¶ For a ship travelling from the Netherlands to China, the route around 40 percent shorter than using the traditional Suez Canal. A huge saving for China, where 50 percent of its GDP is connected to shipping. Russia is also keen to exploit the route as the rise in temperatures is melting the permafrost in its northern territory, playing havoc with its roads and railways.¶ According to Jan Fritz Hansen, deputy director of the Danish shipowners’ association, the real breakthrough will come when there is a cross polar route. At the moment there are are two options - the North East Passge for which Russia asks high fees for transiting ships - or the much-less developed North West Passage along Canada.¶ His chief concern is that "trade up there is free. We don't want protectionism. Everyone should be allowed to compete up there."¶ And he believes the biggest story of the Arctic is not how it is traversed but what will be taken out of it. According to the US Geological Survey (2009), the Arctic holds 13 percent of undiscovered oil and 30 percent of undiscovered gas supplies.¶ Greenland is already at the centre of political tussle between the EU and China over future exploitation of its rare earths - used in a range of technologies such as hybrid cars or smart phones.¶ "The biggest adventure will be the Arctic destination. There is a lot of valuable goods that should be taken out of nature up there," he said.¶ This resource potential - although tempered by the fact that much of it is not economically viable to exploit - has led to fears that the Arctic region is ripe for conflict.¶ But this is nonsense, says Nil Wang, a former Danish admiral and Arctic expert.¶ Most resources have an owner¶ "There is a general public perception that the Arctic region holds great potential for conflict because it is an ungoverned region where all these resources are waiting to be picked up by the one who gets there first. That is completely false," he said.¶ He notes that it is an "extremely well-regulated region," with international rules saying that coastal states have territorial jurisdiction up to 12 nautical miles off their coast.¶ On top of that is a further 200 nautical miles of exclusive economic zone "where you own every value in the water and under the seabed."¶ "Up to 97 percent of energy resources is actually belonging to someone already," says Wang.¶ He suggest the actors in the region all want to create a business environment, which requires stable politics and security.

#### They use flawed data and have it the wrong way

Drezner, 13 – (Daniel, “Military Primacy Doesn’t Pay (Nearly As Much As You Think)”International Security, Volume 38, Number 1, Summer 2013, pp. 52-79)djm

Kagan’s argument is only one of multiple logics through which military pri- macy is hypothesized to be a net economic gain. There are several causal path- ways through which military hegemony translates into economic beneªts to the hegemon, but insufªcient attention has been paid to assessing the com- bined validity of these hypotheses. Stephen Brooks, John Ikenberry, and William Wohforth recently asserted that “the wider payoffs of the United States’ security role for its interests in other realms, notably the global economy . . . [have been] relatively unexplored by international relations scholars.”20 This is true, but there has been signiªcant scholarship on each of the individual causal path- ways through which military primacy can yield pecuniary gain. This article does not exhaustively survey every hypothesized relationship between military predominance and economic beneªt. Fortunately, some argu- ments can be dispatched quickly. For example, the argument that military pri- macy promotes employment by providing a Keynesian or innovative boost to the economy is unpersuasive. Economists have concluded that any employ- ment effect from defense spending is inefªcient compared to similar levels of tax cuts or civilian government spending.21 Similarly, arguments persist to this day that military primacy yields rents through the existence of “informal empire.”22 A quick cursory review of the literature, however, reveals that whatever imperial rents existed in the pre-industrial era have not existed for recent military hegemons.23 The failure of the United States to convert its postinvasion control of Afghanistan or Iraq into lucrative commercial relation- ships is the latest data point to contradict this hypothesis.24 There are three other more viable arguments contending that military pre- eminence generates positive economic externalities. One argument, which I label “geoeconomic favoritism,” hypothesizes that the military hegemon will attract private capital because it provides the greatest security and safety to in- vestors. A second argument posits that the beneªts from military primacy ºow from geopolitical favoritism: that sovereign states, in return for living under the security umbrella of the military superpower, voluntarily transfer re- sources to help subsidize the costs of hegemony. The third argument postu- lates that states are most likely to enjoy global public goods under a unipolar distribution of military power, accelerating global economic growth and re- ducing security tensions. These public goods beneªt the hegemon as much, if not more, than they do other actors. In the next three sections, each of these causal mechanisms is discussed and then measured against the theoretical and empirical literature to assess its validity.

#### Their supporting data is old – empirics go negative, military primacy alone is not sufficient

Drezner, 13 – (Daniel, “Military Primacy Doesn’t Pay (Nearly As Much As You Think)”International Security, Volume 38, Number 1, Summer 2013, pp. 52-79)djm

The other hypothesized voluntary beneªt comes from geopolitical favoritism, wherein other sovereign jurisdictions provide voluntary economic concessions to the dominant security actor. Primacy allows the hegemon to use its military power as a form of extended deterrence to protect multiple strategic partners. In return, these allies and partners can confer economic beneªts, helping to underwrite military hegemony.41 If these countries give preferential treatment to the hegemon’s investors, support its currency as the world’s reserve cur- rency, buy hegemon-issued debt as a way to ªnance defense spending, or sub- sidize the hegemon’s power projection through basing fees, arms purchases, or other transfers, then the relationship between military power and pecuniary beneªts comes into greater focus. More generally, those actors who rely on the hegemon’s security umbrella are less likely to question or subvert its economic order. As Norrlof explains, “The United States is obligated by treaty to defend roughly ªfty countries. These interventions, whether to push back aggressors, or for humanitarian reasons, have purchased goodwill and provided Great Powers with an interest in preserving an American-centered world order.”42 The logic of geopolitical favoritism ªnds some theoretical and empirical support. There are numerous historical examples of “asymmetric” alliances that function as an implicit exchange between large and small allies of security for economic gains. Empirical tests reveal that this kind of exchange of secu- rity beneªts for autonomy beneªts often leads to more durable alliance rela- tionships over time. One obvious example would be the beneªts that the United States accrued after assembling the multilateral coalition to eject Iraq from Kuwait in 1991. Many countries contributed funds to help defray war ex- penditures during that conºict.44 More generally, some key allies, such as Japan, Kuwait and South Korea, heavily subsidize the basing of U.S. troops. Statistical tests in the international political economy literature strongly sug- gest that trade follows the flag—that is, trade ºows are likely to be higher within a security alliance than without one.45 Foreign direct investment ºows produce similar results.46 Additionally, a reason for the dollar’s continued standing as the world’s reserve currency has been the strong security relation- ship between the United States and key capital exporters, Japan and the Gulf Cooperation Council states.47 These actors have been willing to buy dollar- denominated assets even when their ªnancial returns have not been extraordi-narily high. Finally, U.S. policymakers have said that military ties provided them with greater bargaining leverage for negotiating free trade agreements with close allies (e.g., Australia and South Korea) and for shaping the pattern of Paciªc Rim economic governance in groupings such as the Asia-Paciªc Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.48 There are some signiªcant ºaws to this supporting evidence, however. Most of the data that support a connection between security alliances and economic integration come from the Cold War era, not from the post–Cold War era of U.S. military predominance. Theoretically, a bipolar distribution of power is most likely to lead to coherent and segmented blocs of countries. Structural re- alists predict that under bipolarity, relative gains concerns between the two blocs should be relatively high, leading to a tighter integration between secu- rity and economic blocs.49 Statistical tests conªrm that it was during the bipo- lar era of the Cold War that foreign economic policies seemed to most strictly follow the ºag.50 Indeed, whereas the 1990–91 Gulf War happened during the waning days of bipolarity, the 2003 Iraq War occurred during a period of un- contested military primacy—and yet the United States secured far less burden- sharing during Operation Iraqi Freedom than during Operation Desert Storm. A glance at the global political economy of the pre-1914 period or post-1990 era suggests that the linkage between security and economic ties has been much weaker during these eras. In the nineteenth-century era of globalization, trade agreements, trade ºows, migration ºows, and capital ºows bore little relationship to emerging alliance structures.51 Indeed, economic interdepen- dence was so strong among non-allies that it triggered security concerns among the great powers at the turn of the century.52 Most famously, Germany and the United Kingdom were each other’s largest trading partner imme- diately prior to the start of the World War I. The same pattern emerges in the post–Cold War global economy. During a period when the direct economic beneªts from U.S. military primacy should have been at their greatest, China became the epicenter of the global supply chain and the largest foreign market for stalwart U.S. allies such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Furthermore, U.S. military primacy has not deterred China from dramatically expanding its commercial interests across the developing world over the past decade—norhas it deterred countries in the Paciªc Rim, Latin America, Africa, or the Middle East from welcoming Chinese trade and investment.53 The assertions by U.S. policymakers that American military power has translated into tangible policy concessions on economic negotiations do not hold up to empirical scrutiny. If geopolitical favoritism mattered, then the free trade agreement between the United States and South Korea should contain terms that are appreciably more favorable to Washington than those contained in the South Korea–European Union free trade agreement, which was negoti- ated at the same time. Analyses of the two trade deals, however, do not reveal that result. Both agreements are comprehensive and contain roughly similar terms across a wide variety of sectors. While the United States did earn better terms in areas such as vegetable products and transportation, the European Union received better terms on automotive safety protocols, chemi- cals, machinery, and electronics.54 These differences are primarily a function of European and American priorities, not U.S. military leverage.55 Similarly, the claim that the United States has leveraged its security alliances into managing regional economic governance is unsubstantiated. Regional analysts agree that APEC has been the least important regional forum over the past ªfteen years. During that time period, despite U.S. military primacy, most of the forward momentum in regional integration did not include the United States.56 The current state of U.S. basing fees and arms sales also clashes with the geopolitical favoritism hypothesis. If this argument holds, then Washington should earn a signiªcant return on its overseas military bases. Furthermore, from its position of primacy, the United States should dominate the global arms trade. Neither assertion is empirically valid. Most assessments of U.S. basing expenditures conclude that the United States expends, at a minimum, tens of billions more than it receives annually from its forward military pres-ence.57 As Kent Calder concludes in his review of U.S. overseas bases, al- though some countries do subsidize the presence of the U.S. military, “far more common are the cases where the United States pays nations to host bases, rather than getting paid to do so.”58 The post–Cold War trend in arms sales is just as telling. In the aftermath of the Soviet breakup, the United States con- trolled 60 percent of the global arms market. If geopolitical favoritism mat- tered, then U.S. arms producers should have maintained or increased that market share. Jonathan Caverley and Ethan Kapstein’s research reveals, how- ever, that the United States is now responsible for less than 30 percent of the global arms market—a 50 percent decline in U.S. market share. Furthermore, Caverley and Kapstein demonstrate that the United States government incor- porates geopolitical factors into its pricing of arms sales.59 During the era of military primacy, the United States has sacriªced economic rents for stronger political ties. This is an inversion of the geopolitical favoritism hypothesis. History also suggests the absence of a correlation between realpolitik con- cerns and the degree of cooperation among monetary authorities. In the years prior to World War I, for example, central banking authorities cooperated across Europe to avert systemic crises even as foreign ministers engaged in balancing behavior on the continent.60 As Barry Eichengreen observes, “In 1898 the Reichsbank and German commercial banks obtained assistance from the Bank of England and the Bank of France. In 1906 and 1907 the Bank of England, faced with another ªnancial crisis, again obtained support from the Bank of France and the German Reichsbank. The Russian State Bank in turn shipped gold to Berlin to replenish the Reichsbank’s reserves.”61 All of this oc- curred despite the absence of a military hegemon on the European continent. Even with heightened concerns about geopolitical rivalries, central bankers continued to act to preserve the status quo in international monetary relations. Not until the 1911 Agadir crisis did this pattern of international monetary co- operation begin to break down; the Reichsbank, in particular, began to hoard specie in preparation for armed conºict.62 The same pattern emerges for monetary cooperation after the end of the Cold War. Cooperation among global central bankers during the acute phase of the ªnancial crisis was strong.63 And although U.S. allies have helped to prop up the dollar as the world’s reserve currency, China has also played a pivotal role, albeit for self-interested reasons. After the 1998 Asian ªnancial cri- sis, it began to buy dollars as a form of self-insurance against a ªnancial panic. It subsequently purchased dollar-denominated debt as a means of keeping its export-led growth model aºoat.64 Regardless of its reasons, China was not shy in purchasing dollars, helping to keep U.S. interest rates low despite rising budget deªcits over the past decade.65 China also rejected summer 2008 over- tures from Moscow to exploit problems at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as a means to force U.S. action.66 If the United States’ biggest potential rival was en- gaged in the same kind of dollar-supporting role as close allies, then it sug- gests that U.S. bilateral security relationships did not play a causal role in preserving the dollar’s standing as the world reserve currency. Geopolitical favoritism has existed in world politics, but its effects have been more truncated than commonly posited. Geopolitical favoritism matters more during periods of bipolarity than it does under unipolarity. Military primacy does not in and of itself affect direct economic transfers to the hegemonic power. During periods of unipolarity, allies do not appear to have bestowed economic beneªts on the militarily predominant actor any more than they have on its potential rivals.

#### State-based warming politics devalues human security and guarantees interventionism/more emissions, flips the case

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This article has introduced the notion of symmetry to explore the reasons for, and consequences of, the redefinition of climate change. In line with the proposed model for the evolution of associations, the assembling of new material, scientific, economic, and political realities has been examined. Several controversies challenged the linear conception of the climate, and boundary objects such as tipping points helped to enlarge and stabilize a new, heterogeneous association. As an outcome of this coproduction, the nonlinear behavior of the climate system and national security practices have become closely interlinked. While perceiving climate change as a threat has a long-standing history (Weingart, Engels, and Pansegrau 2000; Wiman, Stripple, and Chong 2000), this association, in contrast to earlier attempts, grew to an unprecedented size, eventually destabilizing the traditional ‘‘hierarchy of security’’ (Lacy 2005:48).16 Emerging from this are—despite the above mentioned internal differentiation of the association—three interrelated general trends that could have a decisive impact on global climate governance: the reinforcement of national interests, the marginalization of climate mitigation, and the temptation of interventionism. States remain the ultimate reference point and traditional, narrow, security objectives prevail over human security concerns (Paterson and Striple 2007:154; Dalby 2009:120–124). That is not to say that other actors such as indigenous communities, NGOs, or oil corporations would be precluded from becoming assembled. However, the unexpected rapid warming of regional climates first of all leads national governments to reassert their strategic and economic goals. At the same time, chaotic climate change tends to render emissions reduction efforts, as envisioned by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, more difficult. In particular, the involvement of Western strategic communities dims the prospects for meaningful cuts in US greenhouse gas emissions. Instead, security concerns coupled with nonlinearities, move resilience and adaptation to the top of the priority list. A climate full of inevitable surprises undermines the belief in long-term market-based solutions for mitigation, while the doomsday rhetoric of scientists and campaigners about ‘‘tipping points’’ has apparently failed to spur governments toward negotiating a meaningful agreement. Moreover, the more North American and European practice communities embrace climate apocalypse, the more they tend to resort to interventionism including military operations, geoengineering, and ‘‘large-scale transformational measures’’ to reorganize physical and ecological systems, land use, and human behavior on a planetary scale (Crist 2007:45–51). The political significance of the mapping practice that localizes societal instability in the global South cannot be overestimated in this context. For one thing, at a time when abrupt changes render the issue of fairness even more pressing for climate governance (Schneider and Lane 2006), the focus on climate security shifts the attention, concealing those actors who bear the lion’s share of responsibility for global warming (cf. Roberts and Parks 2007). For another, it depoliticizes resource import–dependent consumerism, whereas future military operations are deemed inevitable. The cruel reality of environmental degradation, civil wars, and deliberate destruction of indigenous livelihoods caused by resource extraction (Peluso and Watts 2001) is overlooked. Due to unhindered, even accelerated, greenhouse gas emissions, the likelihood is increasing that the world will experience warming above the pre-industrial average (Anderson and Bows 2011). In light of this, the advent of an alarming new phase of global warming that is both embodied and reflected in the association of chaotic climate change could seriously hamper efforts to mitigate climate change. The key concerns for further research are thus (i) the assumed inverse correlation between nonlinear climate and international mitigation efforts in terms of the politics of fear, risks, and securitization, and (ii) the vulnerabilities and agencies created by the practices and boundary objects of chaotic climate change such as the evolving discourses of interventionism.

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#### Their reports use terrible methodology to spur action – overestimates impacts and misleads policymakers

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Friday, the world was treated to the latest, greatest report on global warming from the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in the form of its Fifth Assessment Report. It is an embarrassment of internal inconsistency, entirely self-serving, and is beyond misleading. That’s because the IPCC is more intent on maintaining the crumbling “consensus” on global warming than on following climate science to its logical conclusion; a conclusion that increasingly suggests that human greenhouse gas emissions are less important in driving climate change than commonly held. That’s right, the latest climate science (some 10 studies published in just the past 3 years) indicates that the earth’s climate sensitivity—that is, how much the global average surface temperature will rise as a result of greenhouse gases emitted from human activities—is some 33 percent less than scientists thought at the time of the last IPCC Assessment, published in 2007. “ The IPCC misleads policymakers around the world.” A little climate 101: climate sensitivity is one of the key parameters for understanding the future impacts from climate change. Virtually all elements of climate are related in some way to changes in the earth’s average temperature. The less the earth warms up, the fewer the resulting impacts, and the lower the urgency to try to do something to alleviate them. Meaning, initiatives like President Obama’s Climate Action Plan—the motivation for such things as the EPA’s just-announced effective moratorium on future coal-fired power plants—would be even more unnecessary and ineffective than they are already. The IPCC is not altogether blind to the new scientific findings indicating a lower climate sensitivity, but it barely pays them lip-service in its new report. It can’t. Why? The meat of the new IPCC report — and the part that politicians predominantly look to for new legislation — is its projections of future climate change. The problem is that the climate models the IPCC relies upon to produce these projections have a climate sensitivity that averages some 50 percent higher than what the latest science suggests. This means that the IPCC’s projections of future climate change and the resulting impacts are nearly twice as large as they likely should be. In other words, the models don’t work. The IPCC can’t very well admit to the fact that observations say one thing, but the climate models say another. If they did, they would have to throw out virtually the whole report. But just because the IPCC doesn’t admit to it, doesn’t mean that the rest of the world doesn’t know it to be true. It is increasingly obvious that the earth’s average temperature over the past several decades has refused to warm up at the rate foretold by these climate models. In fact, there has been no clear large-scale surface warming for more than 16 years now, and a new paper published earlier this month in the prestigious journal Nature Climate Change affirms the climate models inability to correctly simulate these observations. So we have a situation in which the latest science on two key issues: how much the earth will warm as a result of human greenhouse gas emissions, and how well climate models perform in projecting the warming, is largely not incorporated into the new IPCC report. In this manner, the IPCC misleads policymakers around the world. The IPCC’s exaggerated projections are the root of fears of coming climate disaster (sinking cities, storm-ravaged coastlines, widespread famine, etc.)—fears that result in calls to limit our use of fossil fuels used to produce the energy that supports human society and feeds innovation.

#### Economic engagement policy discussion does not get to the root of our society’s dilemma’s and continues the “business as usual politics” - we must explore our assumptions

White and Williams 12 - Richard J. White, Faculty of Development and Society, Sheffield Hallam University AND Colin C. Williams School of Management, University of Sheffield (“The Pervasive Nature of Heterodox Economic Spaces at a Time of Neoliberal Crisis: Towards a “Postneoliberal” Anarchist Future” Antipode Vol. 44 No. 5 2012 ISSN 0066-4812, pp 1625–1644)

Liberating Education From William Godwin’s (1986 [1793]) polemic about the evils of national education to the present day, anarchists and other dissident thinkers, notably Friere (1972) and Illich (1971), have invested a great deal of attention toward the role of (statecontrolled) schools and education. As Ward (1982:79) argues: “Ultimately the social function of education is to perpetuate society: it is the social function. Society guarantees its future by rearing its children in its own image.” At a fundamental level, encouraging the recognition and development of crypt-economic spaces depends on the ability of contemporary society to unshackle itself from the current straitjacket of neoliberal economic thought and discourse, and instead be inspired to envisage multiple possibilities of a “post-neoliberal” future. Education thus—as it always has— becomes a critical key, not only in inspiring greater critical thought and engagement through engaging with heterodox economics, but also with re-inserting this in broader political frameworks. Undoubtedly education—both compulsory and at higher levels—must give serious consideration as to how best to incorporate these broader economic and political frameworks of reference and understanding. We would argue strongly that a core element of geography must (at all levels) turn towards its anarchist roots once more, dedicate resources not only to de-mystifying the anarchist tradition, but where relevant and possible, engaging directly with the (new) challenges and critiques that anarchism extols as a political and social ideology. Anarchist studies must strive to be, in the words of Shukaitis (2009:169), “more than the study of anarchism and anarchists by anarchists, weaving a strange web of self-referentiality and endless rehashing of the deeds and ideas of bearded nineteenth-century European males”. Pepper (1988:339–340) suggests two ways to introduce the subject of anarchism into the geography classroom: First pupils could be informed of some of the principles underlying various forms of anarchism (e.g., decentralism, self-reliance, anti-specialism, anti-urban/ pro-rural, egalitarianism), and asked to speculate on what changes would occur in Britain’s geography if these principles were applied. Indeed the crisis of both neoliberal economics and the state demands that the need to radicalise and re-think approaches to these domains is taken up, and the current vogue for the “business as usual” model, or the oxymoronic call for “sustainable capitalism” is firmly critiqued, exposed and rejected. As Pepper (1988:350) argues, getting children to critically consider the contemporary (economic, social, political) landscapes should: Wean pupils away from a-historicism: that is, the distressing tendency to see the future as inevitable—i.e., over-conditioned by the present—and only imaginable in terms of extrapolation from present assumptions (of gigantism, capitalism, technological determinism, etc.). Importantly, with respect to the economic the evidence base presented here— which constructively builds upon the critical interventions and interpretations arising from other dissident/heterodox economists—acts as another excellent point of discussion and departure from conventional neoliberal economic dogma. Barriers to Participation in Non-commodified Practices In addition to influencing hearts and minds through pedagogic intervention as a strategy to ensure possibilities for crypto-economic spaces to emerge and thrive, close attention must also be placed to addressing the structural and social barriers to participation in non-commodified work practices. If a “post-capitalist” world is to be constructed, then a greater awareness of the structural and social barriers that prevent greater participation in non-commodified practices is required. Put broadly, and again drawing on previous research in the UK (Burns, Williams and Windebank 2004; White, 2009; Williams and Windebank, 2001) the nature of these barriers are uneven, and not only reflect (a combination) of a household’s lack of money, time, skills, and social networks, but also several social taboos that include “being a burden to others”; “false expectations”, “being taken advantage of” and “being unable to say no to others”. More understanding through empirical research is thus required regarding how individuals can exist better outside the capitalist money economy. A nuanced bottom-up approach to understanding these barriers from the household and community level is desirable if they are to be successfully addressed. There must certainly be a holistic and sensitive, reflective approach in place, one which is committed to recognising the critical intersections that operate in society. Without doubt the anarchist gaze should continue to focus on the sites of production and re-production at the human scale (Sale 1980), including those dominant spaces of education, housing, employment and the family in particular. With respect to the family, any intervention may take on new and unpredictable forms. As Ward (1982:129) argues: Family life, based on the original community, has disappeared. A new family, based on community of aspirations, will take its place. In this family people will be obliged to know one another, to aid one another and to lean on one another moral support on every occasion. It is also important to put the local, the community and the individual, at the heart of change, a point made by Norberg-Hodge (1992:181) in her study of Ladakh society: The fabric of industrial society is to a great extent determined by the interaction of science, technology, and a narrow economic paradigm—and interaction that is leading to ever-greater centralization and specialization. Since the Industrial revolution, the perspective of the individual has become more limited while political and economic units have grown larger. I have become convinced that we need to de-centralize our political and economic structures and broaden our approach to knowledge if we are to find our way to a more balanced and sane society. In Ladakh, I have seen how humanscale structures nurture intimate bonds with the earth and an active and participatory democracy, while supporting strong and vital communities, healthy families, and a greater balance between male and female. These structures in turn provide the security needed for individual well-being and, paradoxically, for a sense of freedom.

#### The drive for economic domination has universalized norms in education which allows neoliberalism to go unchecked – turns all their offense

Callaghan, 04 – professor of sociology at Barry (Karen, “Globalization with a human face” p.66-67)

Within this context, the market plays a central role in describing how education should be conceived. Simply stated, education is understood in a very pragmatic way. In other words, the market issues demands that teachers are expected to incorporate into their courses. The main goal of education, accordingly, is to enable students to adjust successfully to changes in the market. Schools are engaged in the production and transformation of students into compliant and assimilated adults who readily embrace market-based norms and values.3 This educational production is accomplished via spe­cific pedagogical and epistemological maneuvers. In order to perform suc­cessfully, students are required to make significant changes in how they know and understand themselves and the world. All important and valu­able, that is factual, knowledge is supplied without question by the edu­cational institution. The standpoint or perspective of teachers, authors, texts, and so on is never seriously interrogated or analyzed. As Freire says, in this context “the educator’s role is to regulate the *way* the world ‘enters into’ students.”4 Hence, students learn to cast themselves into this quasi-inferior, incompetent status. Their rise from subordination can come only from internalizing the demands of the required curriculum. The end result of this process is that education is equated with high-tech vocational training. Of course, vocational training has been a com­ponent of the general curriculum for quite some time. But some critics have argued recently that something fundamental has changed. Namely, there is no longer much competition among values. Those values that do not directly support the market, in other words, have been undermined or made subordinate to the operation of the marketplace. Hence, the focus of education has become exceedingly narrow.

#### It’s the most relevant question on the topic

Weyland 04 (Kurt Weyland, Professor of History at the University of Texas at Austin. "Assessing Latin American Neoliberalism: Introduction to a Debate". Latin American Research Review. muse.jhu.edu/journals/latin\_american\_research\_review/v039/39.3weyland.html)

Now that more than a decade has passed since the majority of Latin American countries initiated the move to neoliberalism, it is time for scholars to take stock and assess the socioeconomic and political repercussions of the market reform wave. So far, analyses of the cause sand processes of the region's dramatic embrace of free-market economics have predominated in the literature. Over more than a decade, authors have produced a number of outstanding theoretical accounts and a wealth of studies on specific countries or aspects of the market reform process.2 These investigations have greatly advanced scholarly understanding of the conditions and factors that led so many countries to enact momentous reforms that most observers had not anticipated.¶ By contrast, systematic assessments of the socioeconomic and political consequences of the move to free-market economics have only begun to appear recently. Given the volatility of Latin American economies, and of the world economy as a whole, it was difficult to draw firm, reliable conclusions right after the initiation of neoliberalism. In fact, the very nature of market reform, which prescribes the "bitter pill" of tough adjustment in the hope of curing the economy of longstanding ills and ushering in a new era of prosperity, made it prudent to wait for some [End Page 144] stretch of experience to unfold before drawing inferences on the performance of the new development model. To evaluate the recipe of "short-term pain for long-term gain" in a way that was both valid and fair, it was necessary to give economies a chance to emerge from the transitional recession often caused by structural adjustment and to realize the hypothesized growth potential of the new development model.¶ So now, after more than a decade of free-market economics in most Latin American countries, the time has come to conduct systematic evaluations of neoliberalism's socioeconomic results and political repercussions. Indeed, several scholars have already begun to make important forays in this direction, some of them in the Latin American Research Review (see, for instance, Londoño and Székely 2000; Stallings and Peres 2000; Morley 2001; Weller 2001; in LARR, see Berry 1997; Sheahan 1997; Portes and Hoffman 2003). Furthermore, the international financial institutions, powerful promoters of the free-market approach, have compiled a wealth of data and conducted innumerable assessments (see, e.g., Inter-American Development Bank 1998, 13; World Bank 1998; Wodon 2000; De Ferranti et al. 2004). Other international organizations, such as the UN Economic Commission for Latin America, have presented more critical analyses (e.g., CEPAL 1997).

#### It’s the result of group think that’s the root cause of violence and strips life of all meaning—this is an independent reason to vote negative

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One of the deadliest practices we engage in is that of identifying ourselves with a collective entity. Whether it be the state, a nationality, our race or gender, or any other abstraction, we introduce division – hence, conflict – into our lives as we separate ourselves from those who identify with other groupings. If one observes the state of our world today, this is the pattern that underlies our deadly and destructive social behavior. This mindset was no better articulated than when George W. Bush declared “you’re either with us, or against us.” Through years of careful conditioning, we learn to think of ourselves in terms of agencies and/or abstractions external to our independent being. Or, to express the point more clearly, we have learned to internalize these external forces; to conform our thinking and behavior to the purposes and interests of such entities. We adorn ourselves with flags, mouth shibboleths, and decorate our cars with bumper-stickers, in order to communicate to others our sense of “who we are.” In such ways does our being become indistinguishable from our chosen collective. In this way are institutions born. We discover a particular form of organization through which we are able to cooperate with others for our mutual benefit. Over time, the advantages derived from this system have a sufficient consistency to lead us to the conclusion that our well-being is dependent upon it. Those who manage the organization find it in their self-interests to propagate this belief so that we will become dependent upon its permanency. Like a sculptor working with clay, institutions take over the direction of our minds, twisting, squeezing, and pounding upon them until we have embraced a mindset conducive to their interests. Once this has been accomplished, we find it easy to subvert our will and sense of purpose to the collective. The organization ceases being a mere tool of mutual convenience, and becomes an end in itself. Our lives become “institutionalized,” and we regard it as fanciful to imagine ourselves living in any other way than as constituent parts of a machine that transcends our individual sense. Once we identify ourselves with the state, that collective entity does more than represent who we are; it is who we are. To the politicized mind, the idea that “we are the government” has real meaning, not in the sense of being able to control such an agency, but in the psychological sense. The successes and failures of the state become the subject’s successes and failures; insults or other attacks upon their abstract sense of being – such as the burning of “their” flag – become assaults upon their very personhood. Shortcomings on the part of the state become our failures of character. This is why so many Americans who have belatedly come to criticize the war against Iraq are inclined to treat it as only a “mistake” or the product of “mismanagement,” not as a moral wrong. Our egos can more easily admit to the making of a mistake than to moral transgressions. Such an attitude also helps to explain why, as Milton Mayer wrote in his revealing post-World War II book, They Thought They Were Free, most Germans were unable to admit that the Nazi regime had been tyrannical. It is this dynamic that makes it easy for political officials to generate wars, a process that reinforces the sense of identity and attachment people have for “their” state. It also helps to explain why most Americans – though tiring of the war against Iraq – refuse to condemn government leaders for the lies, forgeries, and deceit employed to get the war started: to acknowledge the dishonesty of the system through which they identify themselves is to admit to the dishonest base of their being. The truthfulness of the state’s rationale for war is irrelevant to most of its subjects. It is sufficient that they believe the abstraction with which their lives are intertwined will be benefited in some way by war. Against whom and upon what claim does not matter – except as a factor in assessing the likelihood of success. That most Americans have pipped nary a squeak of protest over Bush administration plans to attack Iran – with nuclear weapons if deemed useful to its ends – reflects the point I am making. Bush could undertake a full-fledged war against Lapland, and most Americans would trot out their flags and bumper-stickers of approval. The “rightness” or “wrongness” of any form of collective behavior becomes interpreted by the standard of whose actions are being considered. During World War II, for example, Japanese kamikaze pilots were regarded as crazed fanatics for crashing their planes into American battleships. At the same time, American war movies (see, e.g., Flying Tigers) extolled the heroism of American pilots who did the same thing. One sees this same double-standard in responding to “conspiracy theories.” “Do you think a conspiracy was behind the 9/11 attacks?” It certainly seems so to me, unless one is prepared to treat the disappearance of the World Trade Center buildings as the consequence of a couple pilots having bad navigational experiences! The question that should be asked is: whose conspiracy was it? To those whose identities coincide with the state, such a question is easily answered: others conspire, we do not. It is not the symbiotic relationship between war and the expansion of state power, nor the realization of corporate benefits that could not be obtained in a free market, that mobilize the machinery of war. Without most of us standing behind “our” system, and cheering on “our” troops, and defending “our” leaders, none of this would be possible. What would be your likely response if your neighbor prevailed upon you to join him in a violent attack upon a local convenience store, on the grounds that it hired “illegal aliens?” Your sense of identity would not be implicated in his efforts, and you would likely dismiss him as a lunatic. Only when our ego-identities become wrapped up with some institutional abstraction – such as the state – can we be persuaded to invest our lives and the lives of our children in the collective madness of state action. We do not have such attitudes toward organizations with which we have more transitory relationships. If we find an accounting error in our bank statement, we would not find satisfaction in the proposition “the First National Bank, right or wrong.” Neither would we be inclined to wear a T-shirt that read “Disneyland: love it or leave it.” One of the many adverse consequences of identifying with and attaching ourselves to collective abstractions is our loss of control over not only the meaning and direction in our lives, but of the manner in which we can be efficacious in our efforts to pursue the purposes that have become central to us. We become dependent upon the performance of “our” group; “our” reputation rises or falls on the basis of what institutional leaders do or fail to do. If “our” nation-state loses respect in the world – such as by the use of torture or killing innocent people - we consider ourselves no longer respectable, and scurry to find plausible excuses to redeem our egos. When these expectations are not met, we go in search of new leaders or organizational reforms we believe will restore our sense of purpose and pride that we have allowed abstract entities to personify for us. As the costs and failures of the state become increasingly evident, there is a growing tendency to blame this system. But to do so is to continue playing the same game into which we have allowed ourselves to become conditioned. One of the practices employed by the state to get us to mobilize our “dark side” energies in opposition to the endless recycling of enemies it has chosen for us, is that of psychological projection. Whether we care to acknowledge it or not – and most of us do not – each of us has an unconscious capacity for attitudes or conduct that our conscious minds reject. We fear that, sufficiently provoked, we might engage in violence – even deadly – against others; or that inducements might cause us to become dishonest. We might harbor racist or other bigoted sentiments, or consider ourselves lazy or irresponsible. Though we are unlikely to act upon such inner fears, their presence within us can generate discomforting self-directed feelings of guilt, anger, or unworthiness that we would like to eliminate. The most common way in which humanity has tried to bring about such an exorcism is by subconsciously projecting these traits onto others (i.e., “scapegoats”) and punishing them for what are really our own shortcomings. The state has trained us to behave this way, in order that we may be counted upon to invest our lives, resources, and other energies in pursuit of the enemy du jour. It is somewhat ironic, therefore, that most of us resort to the same practice in our criticism of political systems. After years of mouthing the high-school civics class mantra about the necessity for government – and the bigger the government the better – we begin to experience the unexpected consequences of politicization. Tax burdens continue to escalate; or the state takes our home to make way for a proposed shopping center; or ever-more details of our lives are micromanaged by ever-burgeoning state bureaucracies. Having grown weary of the costs – including the loss of control over our lives – we blame the state for what has befallen us. We condemn the Bush administration for the parade of lies that precipitated the war against Iraq, rather than indicting ourselves for ever believing anything the state tells us. We fault the politicians for the skyrocketing costs of governmental programs, conveniently ignoring our insistence upon this or that benefit whose costs we would prefer having others pay. The statists have helped us accept a world view that conflates our incompetence to manage our own lives with their omniscience to manage the lives of billions of people – along with the planet upon which we live! – and we are now experiencing the costs generated by our own gullibility. We have acted like country bumpkins at the state fair with the egg money who, having been fleeced by a bunch of carnival sharpies, look everywhere for someone to blame other than ourselves. We have been euchred out of our very lives because of our eagerness to believe that benefits can be enjoyed without incurring costs; that the freedom to control one’s life can be separated from the responsibilities for one’s actions; and that two plus two does not have to add up to four if a sizeable public opinion can be amassed against the proposition. By identifying ourselves with any abstraction (such as the state) we give up the integrated life, the sense of wholeness that can be found only within each of us. While the state has manipulated, cajoled, and threatened us to identify ourselves with it, the responsibility for our acceding to its pressures lies within each of us. The statists have – as was their vicious purpose – simply taken over the territory we have abandoned. Our politico-centric pain and suffering has been brought about by our having allowed external forces to move in and occupy the vacuum we created at the center of our being. The only way out of our dilemma involves a retracing of the route that brought us to where we are. We require nothing so much right now as the development of a sense of “who we are” that transcends our institutionalized identities, and returns us – without division and conflict – to a centered, self-directed integrity in our lives.

#### Cost benefit analysis ignores ethical questions and focuses on producing policy conclusions – causes serial policy failure

Biswas 7 (Shampa, Professor of Politics – Whitman College, “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist”, Millennium, 36(1), p. 117-125)

The most serious threat to the ‘intellectual vocation’, he argues, is ‘professionalism’ and mounts a pointed attack on the proliferation of ‘specializations’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ with their focus on ‘relatively narrow areas of knowledge’, ‘technical formalism’, ‘impersonal theories and methodologies’, and most worrisome of all, their ability and willingness to be **seduced by power**.17 Said mentions in this context the funding of academic programmes and research which came out of the exigencies of the Cold War18, an area in which there was considerable traffic of political scientists (largely trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) with institutions of policy-making. Looking at various influential US academics as ‘organic intellectuals’ involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional relationships at and among numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectives and interests, Christopher Clement has studied US intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold War made possible and justified through various forms of ‘intellectual articulation’.19 This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but indeed a larger question of intellectual orientation. It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to formulate their scholarly conclusions in terms of its relevance for global politics, where ‘relevance’ is measured entirely in terms of policy wisdom. Edward Said’s searing indictment of US intellectuals – policy-experts and Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more resonant in the contemporary context preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The space for a critical appraisal of the motivations and conduct of this war has been considerably diminished by the expertise-framed national debate wherein certain kinds **of ethical questions** irreducible **to formulaic ‘for or against’ and** ‘costs and benefits’ analysiscan simply **not be raised**. In effect, what Said argues for, and IR scholars need to pay particular heed to, is an understanding of ‘intellectual relevance’ that is larger and more worthwhile, that is about the posing of critical, historical, ethical and perhaps unanswerable questions rather than the offering of recipes and solutions, that is about politics(rather than techno-expertise) in the most fundamental and important senses of the vocation.21

#### Only rejection of economic subjectivity in favor of a dialogically produced counter-rationality can make possible challenges to the imperial state—perm still includes the neoliberal criteria for the good

Brown ’03 – Political Science @ Berkeley (Wendy, “Neo-liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy,” Theory & Event 7:1)

What remains for the Left, then, is to challenge emerging neo-liberal governmentality in EuroAtlantic states with an alternative vision of the good, one that rejects homo oeconomicus as the norm of the human and rejects this norm's correlative formations of economy, society, state and (non)morality. In its barest form, this would be a vision in which justice would not center upon maximizing individual wealth or rights but on developing and enhancing the capacity of citizens to share power and hence, collaboratively govern themselves. In such an order, rights and elections would be the background rather than token of democracy, or better, rights would function to safeguard the individual against radical democratic enthusiasms but would not themselves signal the presence nor constitute the central principle of democracy. Instead a left vision of justice would focus on practices and institutions of shared popular power; a modestly egalitarian distribution of wealth and access to institutions; an incessant reckoning with all forms of power -- social, economic, political, and even psychic; a long view of the fragility and finitude of non-human nature; and the importance of both meaningful activity and hospitable dwellings to human flourishing. However differently others might place the accent marks, none of these values can be derived from neo-liberal rationality nor meet neo-liberal criteria for the good. The development and promulgation of such a counter rationality -- a different figuration of human beings, citizenship, economic life, and the political -- is critical both to the long labor of fashioning a more just future and to the immediate task of challenging the deadly policies of the imperial U.S. state.

#### Requiring solutions promotes flawed rationalities, makes their impacts inevitable. Rejection is key

**Mclaughlin 1993** – associate prof philosophy *Regarding nature*, page 171

Is there any basis for a nonanthropocentric ethic that can be both reasonable and socially effective within the thoroughly anthropocentric atmosphere of industrialism? It may be that seeking reasonable arguments and solutions is a subtle reinforcement of the very style of rationality that is one root of our current situation. Neil Evernden might be right when he cautions against asking for solutions, for then the world congeals into the categories of problem and solution. If we were to abandon the framework that separates humans from the rest of nature and casts them into the role of "controllers," while the rest of the world is cast into the role of the "controlled," with what would we be left? Evernden suggests that all we can do right now is to stop and wonder, for only then can something truly new arise. For us wonder is a harbinger of hope, since it reminds us of our ability to suspend belief. If we were to do so, and if the new story we subsequently elaborated no longer casts us in the role of global locust, then our essence would no longer be environmental crisis. But there is no way to deliber­ately elaborate a new story‑it is not a conscious exercise, not something susceptible of reasoned solution. One can only pull back and see what emerges to fill the void. If we wonder, what shall we believe when we emerge from reverie? That is something each of us must explore alone, before there can even emerge a vocabulary adequate to the elaboration of a new “way the world is.”